161. The said decision did not specify the reasons why it was necessary to order the preventive detention of Ms. J., on an individual basis, but rather, the motivation included applied to all the 96 persons included in the decision. Thus, the decision does not include, for example, a determination revealing that there was: (i) sufficient evident leading to a reasonable assumption that Ms. J. specifically took part in the crime of terrorism being investigated, and (ii) a need to detain her on a preventive basis, in real and objective circumstances related to her specific case. In addition, when analyzing the general reasoning included in the decision, it should be stressed that it did not include any motivation of the need to issue the precautionary measure based on any of the permitted legitimate goals; namely, to ensure that the accused would not prevent the implementation of the proceeding or that he or she would not evade the action of justice (supra para. 159). The Court underscores that article 135 of the applicable Code of Criminal Procedure established expressly that an arrest warrant could be issued if it was possible to determine “[t]hat the accused, owing to his record and circumstances, would try and evade the action of justice or obstruct the probative 275 actions.” 162. Nevertheless, the decision only mentions that “the penalty to be imposed [for the crime of terrorism] would be more than four years” (supra para. 160). The Court notes that the evaluation of the need for detention focused only and exclusively on the criterion of the severity of the offense, expressed by the penalty in abstract established by law, denatures the eminently procedural objective of the mechanism of preventive detention and converts it into an premature punishment. In this regard, the Court recalls that preventive detention is a precautionary, and not a punitive, measure. 276 ii. The application to Ms. J. of article 13(a) of Decree-Law 25,475 163. Decree-Law 25,475 of May 1992, applicable to terrorism offenses, established that: “[d]uring the preliminary investigation proceeding, no type of liberty was admissible, without any exception.” 277 Even though this Decree-Law was not in force when the order for the preventive detention of Ms. J. was issued, the Court recalls that this precautionary measure may not be extended when the reasons for its adoption no longer subsist. Thus, this Court has observed that the domestic authorities are responsible for assessing whether it is pertinent to maintain the precautionary measures that they have issued pursuant to their own laws. When performing this task, the domestic authorities must provide sufficient grounds to allow the reasons why the restriction on liberty is retained to be known. 278 Moreover, to ensure that it does not constitute an arbitrary deprivation of liberty under Article 7(3) of the American Convention, the grounds must be based on the need to ensure that the detainee will not prevent the effective implementation of the investigations or evade the action of justice. 279 164. Article 2 of the American Convention establishes the general obligation of the States Parties to adapt their domestic law to its provisions in order to ensure the rights recognized therein. The Court has established that this obligation entails the adoption of two types of measures: on the one hand, the elimination of norms and practices of any nature that result in the violation of the guarantees established in the Convention; on the other hand, the enactment of norms and the implementation of practices leading to the effective observance of the said guarantees. 280 In particular, this means that the State has 275 1991 Code of Criminal Procedure. Legislative Decree No. 638 of April 27, 1991 (merits report, folio 2641) 276 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits, supra, para. 77, and Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, supra, para. 121. 277 Decree-Law No. 25,475 of May 5, 1992, Article 13(a) (file of annexes to the answering brief, annex 7, folio 3261). 278 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra, para. 107, and Case of Bayarri v. Argentina, supra, para. 74. 279 Cf. Case of Bayarri v. Argentina, supra, para. 74. 280 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 207, and Case of Mendoza et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 293. 52