41. The State argued to the Commission that there were no facts that constituted violations of the petitioners’ human rights. Thus, in the State’s opinion, the process of dismissing the petitioners as magistrates of the First Court of Administrative Disputes was carried out in compliance with the principles of due process. The State affirmed that it considered frivolous and unfounded the petitioners’ allegations of discrimination on the part of the State on account of the decisions taken by the petitioners when they were on the bench of the First Court, in highly controversial cases nationally. 42. For their part, the petitioners allege that they did not have access to simple and swift remedies to protect their rights, or to due process that guaranteed proper independence and impartiality of the agencies that heard the case, in violation of Articles 25 and 8 of the Convention. They also allege unwarranted delay in the appeals they filed, which exceeded the deadlines established by Venezuelan law. The petitioners state that their dismissal could be classified as political harassment for having handed down decisions in a number of highly controversial cases, in opposition to the interests of the country’s political administration. 43. The Commission finds that it is not the purpose of this stage of the proceedings to establish whether or not there has been a violation of the American Convention. For admissibility purposes, the IACHR must decide whether facts establishing a violation exist, as stipulated in Article 47(b) of the American Convention, and whether the petition is “manifestly groundless” or “obviously out of order” (Article 47c). 44. The standard for judging these points is different from the standard required for deciding on the merits of the complaint. The IACHR must make a prima facie evaluation of whether the complaint shows cause for the apparent or potential violation of a right guaranteed by the Convention but does not have to establish the existence of a violation. Such a review is a summary analysis that is neither a prejudgment of nor advance opinion on the merits. The Commission’s Rules of Procedure, by establishing two clear stages of admissibility and merits, reflect this distinction between the evaluation the Commission must make in order to declare a petition admissible and the assessment required to establish a violation. 45. The Commission finds that, if proven, the allegation that the magistrates had been dismissed by an agency that had no jurisdiction and was not impartial, without respecting their guarantees of due process and without providing them with simple and swift remedies to challenge such a decision, could characterize a violation of Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, in connection with the general obligations set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of that instrument, in light of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American system. Additionally, the Commission considers that if proven the allegations put forward by the petitioners regarding lack of access, under general conditions of equality, to public functions, such situation could characterized a violation of Article 23(1)(c) of the American Convention. 46. At the same time, the Commission finds that the petitioners have not presented facts that establish discriminatory treatment. The State has alleged and the petitioners have not disproved the allegations that the retirement situation of the three dismissed magistrates and the two retired magistrates were different. Given the different factual situations, differentiated treatment does not constitute discrimination under the terms of Articles 1(1) and 24 of the Convention, according to inter-American jurisprudence 14. Therefore, the petition relative to Article 24 must be declared inadmissible. 14 Inter-American Court Of Human Rights. Proposed Amendments To The Naturalization Provision Of The Constitution Of Costa Rica. Advisory Opinion Oc-4/84, January 19, 1984 Parr. 57. 57.Accordingly, no discrimination exists if the difference in treatment has a legitimate purpose and if it does not lead to situations which are contrary to justice, to reason or to the nature of things. It follows that there would be no discrimination in differences in treatment of individuals by a state when the classifications selected are based on substantial factual differences and there exists a reasonable relationship of proportionality between these differences and the aims of the legal rule under review. These aims may not be unjust or unreasonable, that is, they may not be arbitrary, capricious, despotic or in conflict with the essential oneness and dignity of humankind. 8