3 obstacles, limitations, and contradictions—direction, consistent with the best tendencies in this stage of the ample and difficult history of equality between men and women in the eyes of the law (and, even more so, before the application of the law to a strict reality). 10. Of course, when I refer to women’s rights and liberties I am alluding to two sectors in this universe of juridical protection: a) on one hand, those shared, without exception or distinction, with men: general rights; and b) on the other hand, those related directly and exclusively –or almost exclusively—with the condition of women of their holders. In this last sector what should reign is the adoption of special measures that acknowledge specific characteristics of women – an evident example is the protection before and after giving birth – and that reestablish, introduce, or favor equality between men and women in realms in which they have found themselves in an unfavorable situation with regard to the first due to cultural, economic, political, religious, or other considerations. 11. In rulings regarding equality before the law and other related matters, the Court has clearly stated that the principle of equality and non-discrimination does not suffer damages or a reduction when people are treated differently in situations that justify it, precisely in order to place them in a position that lets them truly exercise their rights and authentically take advantage of the guarantees acknowledged by law to all human beings. Real inequality, marginalization, vulnerability, and weakness must be compensated with reasonable and sufficient measures that generate or favor, as mush as possible, conditions of equality and dismiss all forms of discrimination. The principle of lawfulness –whose origin is in an equal treatment for all- not only does not exclude, but demands, the admission – even better: the need—of a specificity that feeds on such an equal treatment and avoids the failure to which it is frequently exposed. 12. Due to all of the aforementioned, it is perfectly justifiable, and even desirable, that the defense of women’s rights that has been deposited in specific declarations and conventions on this matter occupy front stage in the consideration of international protection organizations. That relevant admission contributes to clarify, strengthen, and enlarge the protective system in its totality. It is consistent with its objectives and it is pertinent and opportune if one takes into account the situation that normally prevails in this matter. Thus, there are legal substantive grounds that back the interest shown in the Convention of Belém do Pará. 13. Having solved this first matter, along comes the one regarding the applicability and, therefore, the application of that instrument by the InterAmerican Court in a specific case, within the fulfillment of its adjudicatory jurisdiction, in such a way that the judgment analyzes and decides on the infringement that could have been suffered by the alleged victim pursuant to the Convention of Belém do Pará. Does the Inter-American Court have the power to issue a ruling regarding that infringement, which would form part of the operative part of a judgment, and to order, based on that, certain consequences derived from the illegal act declared, which would be part of the condemnatory part of the judgment? 14. This question, with its corresponding effects, was solved with regard to the ACHR -–support for the jurisdiction itself of the Court, in its different aspects--, as well as to the Protocol of San Salvador, the Convention regarding Torture and the Convention referring to Forced Disappearances. Now it arises in reference to the Convention of Belém do Pará, surrounding which there have been different points of view. I would not allow myself to disregard them and much less censor them in what they do not coincide with my point of view, but I must express –with regard to them—the opinion I have finally held when voting the Judgment.