4 15. The powers of a jurisdictional body derive, necessarily, of the norm that creates, organizes, and governs it. This link between a juridical norm, on one part, and jurisdiction, on the other –expression, in the jurisdictional order, of the principle of legality--, constitutes a precious guarantee for the defendants and a natural and necessary element of the State of Law. It would be inadmissible and extraordinarily dangerous for people that jurisdictional bodies intend to “construct”, as of its will, the competence it considers convenient. This “voluntarism creator of jurisdiction” would put the body of rights and liberties of human beings in risk and would constitute a form of tyranny not less damaging than the one exercised by other bodies of the public power. It is possible that it be advisable to, pursuant to the evolution of the facts or the law, extend the jurisdictional realm of a body of this nature, so that it may better serve the satisfaction of social needs. But this extension must operate as of the normative reform and not simply from the voluntary –and essentially arbitrary—decision of the jurisdictional body. 16. Consequently, a tribunal –-and specifically, the Inter-American Court-- must explore the normative universe according to which it must discipline its performance, the provisions that grant or deny it attributions to know of certain disputes. This is the first matter analyzed and solved by the jurisdictional body that receives a claim of justice. The matter does not present greater complications when there is a clear and emphatic norm that directly and explicitly grants these attributions. Obviously, there also aren’t any when the norm denies this possibility or grants it to a body different to the one that is analyzing and deciding on its own competence. 17. There is a third situation, that presents itself when the stipulations of the legal code on human rights contains a regimen on the control of a subject by the international bodies of protection, but the formula they use is not in itself, prima facie, sufficiently explicit or univocal or differs from that used in other cases. In this hypothesis, the tribunal must interpret the provision and find its meaning; I am not saying, of course, that it must “complete” the legal code and create, based on its will or imagination, a competence that is not included, at all, in the norm on the control of conventionality of State acts. Its power does not go so far: it must only untangle the sense of the obscure or elusive provision and establish, through that logical-juridical process, its sense and scope. This is what the Inter-American Court does with regard to the Convention of Belém do Pará and its application to the present case. 18. It is desirable that the instruments of the American corpus juris include unequivocal orders, as clear as possible, whose interpretation does not require greater effort by the applicator of the norm, and even for any common reader. It is, in the end, the transparency of the meaning of the norm, in favor of all those obliged or favored by it, a transparency convenient at all levels of juridical regulation. However, in our specific corpus juris there is a diversity of formulas to refer to the international responsibility of the States and the corresponding control when there is a failure to comply with the duties assumed. Each treaty employs its own twist; each one requires, therefore, an autonomous effort of interpretation, which may not simply apply the reasoning and conclusions that supported, in this matter, the understanding of other texts deposited in previous instruments. 19. It is convenient to revise the form in which the treaties that include provisions on international control refer to the matter in question, in the understanding that there are others that do not refer to it. From this revision, one can conclude the existence of a great diversity of expressions used to refer to the same matter and regulate it in an essentially coincident manner. In this subject it is also important to mention the existence of an additional distinction, that will be