One of them, which this opinion shares, is the one stated in a dissenting opinion issued in another case,10 to the effect that this “provision seeks to protect the right of the individual to have disputes arising between two parties, whether private individuals or State bodies and whether or not they refer to human rights issues, decided with the most complete judicial guarantees. This provision is the guarantee, par excellence, of all human rights and a requirement sine qua non for the existence of a State in which the rule of law prevails. We consider that its importance should not be trivialized by applying it to situations that, in our opinion, cannot be the focus of this regulation.” Always according to the said dissenting opinion, “[a] basic presumption for the application of this right is that the State has failed to respect a right or that the State has not provided a remedy should an individual fail to respect a right,” so that “[w]hen a right has been denied, the Convention establishes (under Article 8) the right that a body with the characteristics indicated in this article shall decide the dispute; in other words, the right to proceedings being initiated, where the parties who disagree may, inter alia, submit their respective arguments, present evidence, and contest each other.” In this regard, the provisions of Article 8(1) constitute in themselves a remedy against acts of the State that have affected rights, so that, in consequence, the corresponding sanctionary powers may be exercised. The above-mentioned dissenting opinion recalls that this “has been clearly established by the Court in the precedents cited in the judgment” in reference. A second possible interpretation, which does not exclude the preceding one, is considered in the same dissenting opinion, which recalls that the Court has repeatedly indicated, with regard to Article 8(1) that “its application is not strictly limited to judicial remedies,” that “although the jurisdictional function belongs, in particular, to the Judiciary, other public body or authorities may exercise functions of the same type,” and that, therefore, “any State body that exercises functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature has the obligation to adopt decisions that are in consonance with the guarantees of due process of law in the terms of Article 8 of the American Convention.” The judgment reiterates these affirmations and thus indicates that “Article 8 of the American Convention establishes the standards for due process of law, which consist of a series of requirements that must be observed by the procedural instances, so that every person may defend his rights adequately in the face of any type of act of the State that may affect them”; that it “is not applicable only to judges and courts”; and that “[t]he guarantees established by this norm must be observed in the different procedures in which State bodies adopt decisions determining a person’s rights, because the State also entrusts the function of adopting decisions that determine rights to administrative, collegiate or single-person authorities.”11 A third alternative interpretation, that complements the preceding one, is the one assumed in this opinion, consisting in nuancing or clarifying the aspects affirmed by the Court and in the above-mentioned dissenting opinion. 10 Dissenting opinion of Judges Alirio Abreu Burelli and Cecilia Medina Quiroga, Case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile. Judgment on merits, reparations and costs of September 19, 2006. 11 Paras. 116 and 118. 4