Notwithstanding the above, it could be understood that the terms “judge or tribunal” employed in Article 8(1) also include “the State bodies (that) adopt decisions on the determination of the rights of the individual” 17 or “any State body that exercises functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature”;18 in other words, bodies that are not formal judges or tribunals, but which act as such. In this regard, it should be recalled that the essential and distinctive function of judges is, without doubt, the settlement of disputes; in other words, the exercise of the contentious jurisdiction. Accordingly, should there be a dispute with regard to “the determination of (the) rights and obligation of a civil, labor, fiscal or any other nature,”19 they would evidently be decided by a judge or tribunal. To the contrary, the essence of this judicial function is not the exercise of the noncontentious or voluntary jurisdiction, since this relates to matters that are outside the judicial sphere and belong to the administrative sphere, but whose hearing and settlement is conferred by law on a judge or tribunal, even though there is no dispute about them and, for different reasons, including the possibility that disputes could arise in relation to them. Without this express assignment by law, a judge or tribunal could not hear and decide such matters and, therefore, the pertinent matters would continue being the competence of administrative authorities and the non-contentious or voluntary jurisdiction would not exist with regard to them. Consequently, it is based on the foregoing jurisdiction that, on the one hand, if there is no dispute as regards “the determination of (the) rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal or any other nature,” that determination would not be included in the said jurisdiction unless the law had provided that it should be made by a judge or tribunal. Furthermore, precisely because the non-contentious or voluntary jurisdiction is closely connected to the institution of judge or tribunal (outside of which it is not justified and does not exist), assigning to another body, particularly an administrative entity, the hearing and settlement of matters that are generally included in that jurisdiction, such as “the determination of (the) rights and obligation of a civil, labor, fiscal or any other nature,” would not be conferring on the said administrative body or entity a different jurisdiction to that which it already possesses as such, but rather incorporating a new element into its jurisdiction. From the above it can be inferred that, only when an administrative body or entity has clearly been granted the authority to decide disputes concerning specific administrative matters, which would normally fall within its own sphere, such as those relating to “the determination of (the) rights and obligation of a civil, labor, fiscal or any other nature,” would this be admissible under the contentious jurisdiction which has thus been granted to it even though it is neither judge nor tribunal. In such cases, it will act and be considered as such, and will be a “State body (that, without being a judge or 17 Para. 118. 18 Dissenting opinion of Judges Abreu and Medina, cit. 19 Art. 8(1). 6