made by the Commission and the presumed victims,” while indicating that the representatives “address a series of issues that exceed the sphere of competence ratione materiae.” 27. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the State’s position is unclear and fails to justify how the admissibility of the case would be affected or why the Court would be prevented from hearing it. Consequently, the Court rejects the said preliminary objection filed by the State. B.2.) Regarding the lack of temporal competence 28. As the Court has indicated previously, in order to decide whether it has competence in relation to a case or any aspect thereof, it must: Take into consideration the date of acceptance of this competence by the State, the terms in which this acceptance was executed, and the principle of non-retroactivity established in Article 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Even though the State is obliged to respect and ensure the rights protected by the American Convention from the date on which it ratified this instrument, the competence of the Court to declare a violation of its norms is governed by the said acceptance by the State. 10 29. When ratifying the American Convention on August 21, 1990, Chile declared that it “accepted the competence of the Court as legally binding […] with regard to cases relating to the interpretation and application of [the] Convention, […] placing on record” that this referred to “acts subsequent to the date on which the instrument of ratification was deposited and, in any case, to acts that began to be executed after March 11, 1990.” The Court has already indicated that “the ‘declaration’ made by Chile constitutes a temporal limitation of the acceptance of the competence of this Court,” 11 based on a faculty of the States Parties under Article 62 of the Convention. 12 30. Despite the foregoing, and even when faced with temporal limitations similar to those of this case, the Court has established that even when a State obligation refers to acts that occurred prior to the date of acceptance of the respective competence, the Court may analyze whether or not the State complied with that obligation as of the date of acceptance. 13 In other words, the Court may make the said examination, to the extent that this is feasible, based on independent facts that took place within the temporal limits of its competence. 31. In this regard, some of the Court’s precedents may be recalled. In the case of Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua concerning the death of Jean Paul Genie, on October 28, 1990, the State argued that the Court did not have temporal competence because Nicaragua had “accepted the competence of the Court on February 12, 1991, ‘with the reservation that the 10 Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra, para. 36. 11 The Court also clarified that the “declaration” made by Chile when ratifying the Convention does not constitute a reservation (Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, paras. 43, 44 and 45). 12 Cf. Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters. Preliminary objections. Judgment of November 23, 2004. Series C No. 118, para. 73. Similarly, Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra, para. 35. 13 Cf. Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124, para. 43; Case of Garibaldi v. Brazil. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 23, 2009. Series C No. 203, para. 23; Case of the Las Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits reparations and costs. Judgment of November 24, 2009. Series C No. 211, paras. 47 and 48, and Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra, para. 39. 11