design of the text, and in view of Article 26, the Court has the power to declare the international responsibility of a State if it has fallen short of its obligations for progressive development and no regression, but not for violation of the ESCERs considered individually. 22. This view is consistent with my position as expressed in earlier opinions, that the correct doctrine the Court should follow is specifically to consider the economic, social, cultural and environmental dimensions of the rights enshrined in the text of the Convention, and to exercise its adjudicatory jurisdiction on the basis of related actions, if in fact a relationship of this kind can be determined. The declaration of responsibility based on related actions in no case empowers the Court to hold that rights not recognized in the Convention have been violated. Even this type of procedure simply provides a means to identify the appropriate relationships between the ESCERs and the civil and political rights set forth in the Convention. 23. It should also be stated, as I mentioned earlier, that the system of interpretation applicable to the provisions of the Convention should adhere to the rules of interpretation of the VCLT. This means considering such factors of interpretation as good faith, the usual meaning of terms in the context of the treaty, and the object and purpose of the treaty. The latter point, as Cecilia Medina teaches, points to two specific features in the hermeneutics of human rights treaties: “their dynamism and the pro persona role, which provide judges with ample scope for a very creative interpretation.” 67 24. One of the most important canons of interpretation in international human rights law is the evolving, pro persona interpretation. This standard was followed in several cases, including the Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 68 regarding the right to property, 69 or the Case of Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile, 70 on the right to equality and nondiscrimination. 71 In the instant case, however, the Court has not applied this standard of interpretation, but instead asserts its jurisdiction over matters that the different instruments have not entrusted to it, that is, to which the States Parties have not consented. In other words, it is an error to wield these hermeneutic tools as a basis to expand the Court’s jurisdiction, when there is an explicit provision that sets clear, precise boundaries to it. 25. In short, this approach undermines the legal certainty that an international court must guarantee, as well as the legitimacy of its decisions, because the argument as given simply ignores a provision that expressly limits the Court’s jurisdiction to hear cases of alleged violations of ESCERs. 26. The justification and grounds for a judicial decision should properly be that the arguments put forward allow the reader to replicate and understand the reasoning process by which the Court arrived at a particular ruling. The decision that an ESCER is enforceable cannot be based on ignoring the rules of jurisdiction set forth in the Convention and its additional Protocol. 67 Cf. MEDINA, Cecilia: The American Convention on Human Rights (2nd edition). Crucial Rights for their Theory and Practice. Intersentia Ltd. Cambridge, UK, 2016, p. 54. 68 I/A Court HR. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2001. Series C No. 79. 69 In this case, the Court interpreted that Article 21 of the Convention, the right to property, protected the particular characteristics of communal land ownership of indigenous peoples. 70 I/A Court HR. Case of Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2012. Series C No. 254. 71 In this case, the Court judged that sexual orientation and gender identity are categories protected by the American Convention under the notion of “other social condition” set forth in Article 1(1).