7. On its behalf, in the brief on observations to the final list, the representatives expressed that the offer of expert witnesses is contrary to the provisions of Article 41 of the Rules of Procedure and thus timebarred. They further expressed that the State sought to remedy this problem by seeking a subsidiary or alternative claim, which suggests, given the State’s negligence, that the Court officially decreed the expert nominated by the State as part of its regulatory power. Thus, the view ex oficio provide for the experts proposed by the State within the Court’s regulatory powers. Therefore, the representatives considered that the State renounced its request for expert witnesses, by not complying with the regulatory requirements of an offer. Secondly, they presented challenges and objections to those expert witnesses who were offered on the ground that there are impediments that affect their impartiality, and they do not have technical ability to render the expert reports. 8. Furthermore, the Commission stated that the mechanism used by the State for its appointment of experts is not established in the Rules of Procedure, and thus the evidence offered is time-barred, to which the State did not present any arguments, at any of the procedural opportunities it had, regarding the circumstances established in Article 57(2) regarding admissibility under exceptions. The Commission also argued that the alternative or subsidiary claim of the State does not comply with the Court’s exercise of the power regarding the seeking of evidence ex officio, as the only evidence offered would support its position in this case, and because an offer on its behalf to fund international experts "ex officio” could be problematic in light of the principle of procedural equality, since it is reasonable to infer that the representatives do not necessarily have the same opportunity to make such offer. 9. Pursuant to that established in Article 41(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, the opportune procedural moment for the presentation of expert evidence by the State is in its answer brief. In this case, the State did not identify in its answer those persons proposed as expert witnesses, but rather limited itself to arguing the necessity of the expert evidence, defining the purpose of the expert reports it proposed. During this opportunity, the State did not provide the curriculum vitaes; it expressed that it would provide them “as soon as possible,” which it did not do within the period of 21 days established in Article 28 of the Rules of Procedure regarding the provision of annexes to the answer brief. Subsequently, in its final list of declarants, the State offered two expert witnesses and one witness for the hearing and two expert witnesses to render statements via affidavit; it indicated the names of the expert witnesses and provided their curriculum vitaes. Upon reiterating the purposes of the statements that had been initially proposed, the State once again raised its “subsidiary request” (supra Considering clause. 5). Until that moment, the State had not argued any of the exceptions established in Article 57(2) of the Rules of Procedure to justify its offer of evidence. As such, and notwithstanding the possible decision on the admissibility of this evidence, a period was granted to those offered as expert witnesses in order for them to present their observations (supra Having seen clause 11). It was not until the request for an extension (supra Having seen clause 13) that the State expressed that the provision of the final list and curriculum vitaes of the expert witnesses “had been carried out in good faith and heeding to the requirements of the Court” and it argued, as well, that Mr. Eduardo Montealegre Lynett had been appointed as Attorney General of the Nation and that, at the time of his appointment, he was the State’s Agent in this case, a situation which “became a situation of force majeur for the State, which affected the attention given to the case and its follow-up, having to take urgent measures to assure due representation.” Thus, it requested that the Court “assess the situation as insurmountable and declare that the expert evidence offered by the State was timely.” 10. The State provided, in a tardy fashion, the identification and curriculum vitaes of the proposed expert witnesses, without offering a clear explanation. Neither did it argue one of the exceptions under Article 57(2) of the Rules of Procedure, until a much later time. As noted by the State itself in its observations to the final lists (infra Considering clause 20), in light of Article 46 of the Rules of Procedure, the final list of declarants is just an opportunity to confirm or retract the offered evidence. Thus, the State’s failure to offer expert evidence at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner, leads the Court to declare that it is inadmissible.3 7. First, the Court reiterates that pursuant to Article 41(c) of the Rules of Procedure, the proper procedural moment for the State to identify its proposed declarants is in its brief answering the application.4 The Tribunal recalls that in this case, the State itself had indicated 3 Case of the Massacre of Santo Domingo, Order of the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of June 5, 2012, Considering clauses 9 and 10. 4 Article 41(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court: “The respondent shall, in writing, state its position regarding the presentation of the case and, if applicable, answer the brief containing pleadings, motions, and evidence within a non-renewable term of two months from the receipt of the latter brief and its annexes, without prejudice to the term that the Presidency may establish in the circumstances mentioned in Article 24(2) of these Rules of 5