3 paradoxes, pitfalls; the concentration of correctional powers, which at times amount to overwhelming abuses; the deficiency of facilities and guards —in contrast with the apparent kindness of many norms— and the repeated commission of crimes and offenses by both authority agents charged with the custody and “treatment” of prisoners and co-prisoners whose violence should be prevented, faced and restrained by the State. 10. The duty of custody vests in the State, by virtue of its special role as guarantor of the rights of inmates, and this duty is twofold in that protection should be awarded against the State itself and against third parties, as public obligations comprise all conducts that could impair the rights of inmates, i.e. they are enforceable erga omnes. At any rate, if the State does not provide for this general protection, who can provide it to those who have been deprived of their freedom and are no longer capable of defending themselves? Whose duty is it to protect the rights of inmates who have been de jure and de facto delivered unto the hands of prison guards, i.e. under the political, ethical and juridical responsibility of public power who confines them and meticulously controls their existence? 11. In the darkest hour of life in prison, incarceration dilemmas did not call the attention of the courts, as long as they did not call for the commencement of new proceedings against inmates on the grounds of the alleged commission of new crimes within prison facilities. But this did not amount to “penitentiary judicial assistance” proper. It began to be penitentiary judicial assistance when inmates were no longer considered —either in theory or in fact— “a thing of the administration” and the principle of legality made headway in issues of custody and execution of sentence, as it had made headway long before in connection with both the description of punishable conducts and the associated legal consequences, and the setting up of courts and the rules of criminal procedure. Executive legality joined the lines, though feebly —very feebly— of criminal and procedural legality. This principle was eventually heralded by the jail oversight court, a rule-of-law body that protects the rights of inmates. 12. Data on prison, that go against constitutional mandates and defy the values and principles adopted by fundamental laws —which make no exception for anyone: neither criminals nor prisoners— triggered the application of constitutional jurisdiction to this ambit. It is not that constitutional courts should administer prisons —as it has once been erroneously criticized. They key issue is that the Rule of Law proclaimed by the supreme law should also prevail within prisons, and that the values of a democratic society are preserved notwithstanding the punitive power of the State, which must be exercised with control, legitimacy, humanness, efficiency and transparency. There have been many setbacks in this healthy road. At any rate, it is clear that constitutional control over the acts and conduct of authorities does not vanish against prison walls, cell bars or executors’ discretion. 13. Later on, prison issues reached the international courts of human rights. We are now at this stage, which does not exclude the others. Like in other contexts, these courts perform the function typical of international jurisdiction with respect to national jurisdiction: a subordinate and supplementary function. The American Convention on Human Rights contains provisions concerning prisoners, whether under arrest, pretrial detention or punitive imprisonment, and based on those provisions —as in the present case— the intervention of the Inter-American Court is requested.