10 specific matters, the Montego Bay Convention managed to establish a compulsory procedure with coercive elements; the choice of specific procedures at least ensures the resolution of conflicts in accordance with the law under the said Convention. 19 37. These examples are sufficient to reveal that compulsory jurisdiction is a reality today – at least in specific circumscribed domains of international law, as I have just indicated. Compulsory international jurisdiction is, ultimately, a real juridical possibility. If it has still not been generally attained at the universal level, this should not be attributed to an absence of juridical viability, but rather to an erroneous perception of it role, or simply to a lack of willingness to expand it scope. Compulsory jurisdiction is a manifestation of the recognition that international law is, more than voluntary, really necessary. 38. In addition to the progress already achieved to this end, reference should be made to similar initiatives and efforts. One example is the proposal for a draft protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights that I prepared as Rapporteur of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which, inter alia, supports an amendment to Article 62 of the American Convention in order to make the InterAmerican Court’s jurisdiction on contentious matters automatically compulsory when the American Convention is ratified. 20 I hope that these proposals will prosper when our community of nations attains a greater level of awareness of the need to improve the protection mechanisms of the American Convention. VI. Jus Cogens in the convergence between international humanitarian law and international human rights law. 39. In addition to my previous observations on the second and first operative paragraphs of this judgment on preliminary objections in the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, and the other operative paragraphs (the third to the seventh), which I have voted in favor of, I would like to add some brief considerations on the fifth operative paragraph, in which the Court has correctly rejected the second preliminary objection, entitled objection owing to lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae. In the considering paragraphs on this preliminary objection (paras. 111 to 119), which it correctly rejects (para. 120), the Court refers pertinently to the convergence and complementarities between international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It also refers to relevant provisions of the norms on both aspects of the protection of human rights. I would reason different, and go further than the Court, to reach the same conclusion as that reached by the Court, rejecting the said objection. 19 . L. Caflisch, "Cent ans de règlement pacifique des différends interétatiques", 288 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye (2001) pp. 365-366 and 448-449; J. Allain, "The Future of International Dispute Resolution - The Continued Evolution of International Adjudication", in Looking Ahead: International Law in the 21st Century / Tournés vers l'avenir: Le droit international au 21ème siècle (Proceedings of the 29th Annual Conference of the Canadian Council of International Law, Ottawa, October 2000), The Hague, Kluwer, 2002, pp. 61-62; S. Karagiannis, "La multiplication des juridictions internationales: un système anarchique?", in Société française pour le Droit international, in La juridictionnalisation du Droit international (Colloque de Lille), Paris, Pédone, 2003, p. 34; M. Kamto, "Les interactions des jurisprudences internationales et des jurisprudences nationales", in ibid., p. 424. 20 . A.A. Cançado Trindade, Informe: Bases para un Proyecto de Protocolo a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, para Fortalecer Su Mecanismo de Protección, tomo II, 2a. ed., San José, Costa Rica, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2003, pp. 1-64.