processes, with their respective positions, their rights, the interests they bring to the
proceedings, their motives and expectations. Furthermore, the conditions in which the case
is examined must be borne in mind, because it may be heard under the pressure of
different types of contingency, ranging from natural to social.
5.
The procedural conduct of the interested party may be the determining factor in the
prompt or delayed attention to the dispute. I refer to the activity in the proceedings and, in
this regard, to the procedural activity, but it is also necessary to consider the activity – or,
better still, the conduct: active or omissive – in other areas, if it transcends the proceedings
or has an influence on them. It may be that, in order to defend his rights, the individual
uses a wide range of the instruments and opportunities that the law makes available to him,
such as appeals or other mechanisms, which delay the decision on merits. It is also
necessary to be on guard against the possibility that an individual dispenses with actions to
defend himself in order to move forward promptly or following supposed criteria of
rationality in the opinion of distant or interested observers. The Court must distinguish
prudently between the acts and omissions of the litigant – well or badly advised – to defend
himself, and those whose only purpose is to create delays. Obviously, it is not a matter of
transferring to the accused, who is defending himself, the responsibility for the delays in the
trial and, consequently, for violation of the reasonable time that prejudices him.
6.
In relation to the conduct of the court – although, it would be preferable to refer, in
general, to the conduct of the authorities, because it is not only the court that functions in
the name of the State – the activity exercised with justifiable caution and reflection should
be distinguished from the activity performed with excessive parsimony, exasperating
slowness and excessive ritual. What is the possible conduct or performance of a court (or,
more broadly, of an authority) genuinely dedicated to deciding the disputes submitted to it,
and that of a court that sidetracks its energy while the accused await rulings that are never
handed down?
7.
In this regard, the deficit of courts, the complexity of outdated procedural systems,
and the overwhelming workload are relevant factors, even as regards courts that make a
real effort to be productive. It is necessary to be aware of these factors; nevertheless, none
of them should impair the rights of the individual and prejudice him. An excessive workload
cannot justify the failure to respect reasonable time, which is not a balance between volume
of domestic litigations and number of courts, but rather an individual reference for a specific
case. All those shortcomings become obstacles, ranging from severe to insurmountable, to
access to justice. Does the impossibility of having access to justice because the courts are
overloaded with cases or have frequent legal holidays no longer violate rights?
8.
Furthermore, in the same opinion in the López Álvarez case – and in others that I will
mention below – I indicated that it was necessary to expand the analysis of the reasonable
time and examine the possibility of incorporating other elements that merited analysis into
this concept – in order to assess respect for or failure to respect due process. In the said
opinion, I stated: “it seems possible that the complexity of the matter that motivates the
process, the behavior of the interested party –in this case, the defendant—and the acts of
the authority may not be enough to provide a convincing conclusion of the undue delay,
that violates or puts the judicial rights of the subject in grave danger. Thus the
appropriateness, in my opinion, of exploring other elements that complement, but do not
substitute them, for the determination of a fact – the violation of the reasonable time — for
which there are no quantitative universally-applicable boundaries.”
9.
Then I mentioned “as a possible fourth element to be considered in estimating a
reasonable time, what I called the ‘actual impairment of an individual’s rights and