3 whereabouts of the victims of an actual disappearance. Much of the content of these instruments is devoted to prescribing the adoption of measures towards these ends 3. However, it does not seem possible to relate this aspect of forced disappearance to the provision of the American Convention (not to mention other protection treaties) on the right to recognition of juridical personality. During discussions on the draft of this judgment, I have been wondering whether this aspect of a disappearance attacks some of the basic presumptions of the right to recognition of juridical personality. And I have been reflecting on the possibility of arguing that, for a human being to be recognized as a subject of rights and obligations or, more precisely, for maintaining in effect the recognition of his condition of subject of rights and obligations, which jurisprudence grants him, it is important that he should not fall into this nebulous limbo of uncertainty about his existence that disappearance implies. However, I have finally been obliged to conclude that matters relating to this state of uncertainty belong to the order of the exercise of rights and not to the recognition of juridical personality, in the terms and for the purposes for which it is embodied in Article 3 of the American Convention. * * * I must express my dissatisfaction with paragraph 180 of the judgment, which forms part of the Court's considerations about the issue of whether or not Article 3 of the Convention was violated. In my opinion, this paragraph combines issues that should be treated separately and also introduces a reflection on the arbitrary deprivation of life, the relationship of which to the right to the recognition of juridical personality needs to be developed further in order to make the thread of the argument comprehensible. * * * I share the Court's assertion, formulated in the context of examining the compliance or non-compliance with Article 1(1) of the American Convention, about its lack of competence to declare that a State has violated the 1949 Geneva Conventions on international humanitarian law. I regret, however, that the issue of humanitarian laws was not introduced in relation to Article 2 of the American Convention. In a country undergoing an internal armed 3 Among the provisions referred to, we should mention the following: a prompt and effective recourse must be designed in application of which the competent authorities would have access to all the places where persons deprived of their liberty are kept and to any other type of place where there is reason to believe that disappeared persons could be; persons deprived of liberty may only be confined in officially-recognized places; precise information should be provided promptly about the detention of these persons and the places where they are detained (including places of transfer), to their families and their lawyers; in any place of detention, there must be an official up-to-date record of all the persons deprived of liberty, available to the families and lawyers of those detained; a central record should be established that complies with the characteristics mentioned in the previous point; State agents who, without reason, refuse to provide information on a deprivation of liberty should be punished; when information is given that a detainee has been freed, the means should be provided to allow this to be verified with certainty; the results of investigations into disappearances shall be communicated to all interested persons, unless this obstructs the preparation of the respective criminal action; any forced disappearance shall be considered to be a permanent crime while its authors continue to conceal the fate and whereabouts of the person who has disappeared and while the facts are not clarified.