28 this regard that Carlos Manuel García Morales, who was tried with Mr. Raxcacó Reyes, was not sentenced to death. 74. In this regard, the Court notes that, in the judgment of May 14, 1999, the Sixth Court for Criminal Sentencing, Drug-Trafficking and Environmental Crimes (supra para. 43(10)) made a distinction between the authors of the crime of kidnapping or abduction. On the one hand, they classified Mr. Raxcacó Reyes and two of the other accused persons as “direct authors” and, on the other hand, they classified Carlos Manuel García Morales as an “author.” The Sentencing Court explained that the distinction was based on the fact: That the participation of the accused García Morales was circumscribed to “taking care of the kidnapped child during the night he remained captive,” thus showing that he had not taken part in the criminal act, even though he had played a role, which, in the court’s opinion, was less immediate and decisive, because it was dependent on the perpetrator carrying out the illegal criminal act. No element of evidence produced during the hearings revealed that the defendant Carlos Manuel García Morales had agreed and taken part in the crime category of perpetration, but rather had collaborated in the perpetration of the crime. The foregoing has led the court to consider that the criminal responsibility of the accused could not be sanctioned with the punishment corresponding to the perpetrators.47 75. Therefore, the Sentencing Court decided: That CARLOS MANUEL GARCÍA MORALES, is responsible for the crime of KIDNAPPING OR ABDUCTION, committed against the individual safety and freedom of the child PEDRO ALBERTO DE LEON WUG, as an AUTHOR [and,] as a result of this criminal offense, he is sentenced to FORTY YEARS’ INCOMMUTABLE IMPRISONMENT […].48 76. From the Sentencing Court’s reasoning, it is clear that the participation of Mr. García Morales in the crime was not considered to be actual perpetration, but rather the cooperation characteristic of an accomplice. Consequently, the punishment corresponding to the latter was applied, rather than the punishment reserved for the former (supra para. 43(4)). 77. Moreover, the Sentencing Court limited itself to examining the level of participation of the different actors in the illegal act they were accused of, but did not assess possible attenuating or aggravating factors, or take into account the guilt of those responsible or the specific circumstances of the crime, as established in Article 65 of the Guatemalan Penal Code, which states: The judge or tribunal shall determine, in the judgment, the corresponding punishment, within the maximum and minimum indicated by law for each crime, taking into account the greater or lesser dangerousness of the guilty person, his personal history and that of the victim, the motive for the crime, the extent and severity of the harm caused and the attenuating or aggravating circumstances that exist in relation to the act, both the quantity and quality of which should be assessed. The judge or tribunal shall record 47 Cf. judgment delivered by the Sixth Court on Criminal Sentencing, Drug-Trafficking and Environmental Crimes of Guatemala on May 14, 1999 (file of appendixes to the application, appendix 5, folios 100-167). 48 Cf. judgment delivered by the Sixth Court on Criminal Sentencing, Drug-Trafficking and Environmental Crimes of Guatemala on May 14, 1999 (file of appendixes to the application, appendix 5, folios 100-167).