35 176. According to the representative, “pharmaceutical, medical, and transfer expenses must not necessarily be proven by means of documentary evidence, where the need to incur them results from the very nature of the injuries suffered or from the treatment undergone by the victim.” On this account, she requested the amount of US$ 55,855.92 (fifty-five thousand dollars eight hundred fifty-five United States dollars and ninety-two cents). This amount includes expenses incurred as “comprehensive medical cover,” “psychiatry and medical psychology,” and “treatment medication,” all of which were estimated as from April 1999, when Mr. Bueno-Alves sought psychiatric treatment, to December 2016, “considering a life expectancy of ten more years [,] that is, until the [v]ictim is 71 years of age.” 177. The State pointed out that “it is aware that the events suffered by [Mr.] Bueno-Alves might have resulted in the victim’s need to undergo physical, psychological, and psychiatric treatment, which he is still undergoing.” But it questioned the amount claimed as compensation and resorted to the Court’s prior decisions to “set a reasonable compensatory amount on this account.” 178. The Court understands that as a result of certain types of violations of human rights, as would be the case of torture, the victims might have to seek medical and/or psychological treatment. But this should not be deemed to be the general rule. According to the particular characteristics of the person suffering torture or to the torture method used, medical treatment is not always necessary. It may be the case that some persons who needed special (medical or psychological) treatment may not have sought it. If that were the case, compensation would cover non-pecuniary damages and the pertinent pecuniary damages, among which future medical or psychological treatment might be included, but it would not cover expenses for treatment which was never received. In sum, whenever it is alleged that the victims have sought medical or psychological treatment, sufficient documentary evidence must be submitted so that the Court may estimate the expenses which have been actually incurred. 179. In view of the foregoing, the Court does not admit the representative’s argument that no evidence is required to prove that the expenses for which reimbursement is claimed have been actually incurred. 180. Furthermore, the Court notes that the representative estimated the amount of medical expenses for which compensation is sought up to December 2016, that is, as expenses that have already been incurred and expenses to be incurred. Later, when she requested compensation for “future consequential damages” (infra para. 186), she requested again compensation for future medical and psychological treatment. In this regard, the Court agrees with the allegation made by the State that the representative duplicated her claim, when estimating the same item in two different chapters. Therefore, in this chapter the Court will only consider the expenses which have been allegedly incurred to date, while future expenses will be analyzed in the chapter on “future consequential damages.” 181. The State alleged that the victim “had, and does have, the possibility to have access to the network of public and free health institutions where he could have received treatment without having to resort to a private health organization.” Notwithstanding, the State has not tendered any evidence which shows that there is a public system in the country which provides specialized treatment for the victim’s injuries, that such services are effective, and that Mr. Bueno-Alves had actual and effective access thereto. Likewise, the State has not tendered any evidence showing that it has offered to provide treatment to the victim through its own institutions. Therefore, the Court disregards this argument.