have a direct interest, a pre-established position or a preference for one or other party, and that they are not involved in the dispute.”254 186. Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court must determine whether, in this case, the State has violated the rights to judicial guarantees and to judicial protection established in Articles 2, 8, and 25 of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument, taking into account that the investigation of the facts and the final decision to acquit those presumably responsible was carried out exclusively by organs of the military jurisdiction. 1. The military justice system cannot be the competent jurisdiction for human rights matters 187. Under democratic rule of law, military criminal justice must be restrictive and exceptional so that it is only applied to protect special juridical rights of a military nature that have been violated by members of the armed forces in the exercise of their functions.255 In addition, it has been tis Court’s consistent case law that the military justice system is not the competent jurisdiction to investigate and, as appropriate, prosecute and punish the authors of human rights violations, but rather the prosecution of those responsible always corresponds to the ordinary justice system.256 This conclusion applies to all human rights violations. 188. This consistent case law of the Court has also indicated that the military jurisdiction does not meet the requirements of independence and impartiality established in the Convention.257 In particular, the Court has noted that when officials of the military criminal jurisdiction responsible for investigating the facts are members of the armed forces on active duty, they are not able to issue an independent and impartial ruling.258 189. Similarly, the Court has established that remedies before the military courts are not effective to decide cases of serious human rights violations, much less to establish the truth, prosecute those responsible, and make reparation to the victims, because those remedies that, for different reasons, result illusory cannot be considered effective, such as when the judicial organ lacks independence and impartiality. 190. In this case, the arbitrary deprivation of life, the extrajudicial executions, and the injuries to the Haitian survivors perpetrated by military personnel are acts that, under no circumstances, bear any relationship to the military mission or discipline. On the contrary, such acts affected rights protected by domestic criminal law and the American Convention, such as life and personal integrity (supra paras. 97 and 98). It is evident that such conducts are clearly contrary to the obligations to respect and protect human rights and, therefore, are excluded from the competence of the military jurisdiction. 254 Cf. Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, supra, para. 146, and Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, supra, para. 117. 255 Cf. Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of August 16, 2000. Series C No. 68. Para. 117, and Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia, supra, para. 240. 256 Cf. Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, supra, para. 142, and Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia, supra, para. 240. 257 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, supra, para. 132, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra, para. 198. 258 Cf. Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru. Merits, supra, para. 125. 52