2 limited to judicial remedies, “but rather the procedural requirements that must be observed to be able to speak of effective and appropriate judicial guarantees so that a person may defend himself adequately when any type of act of the State affects his rights.” It adds that the State’s exercise of its power to sanction “not only presumes that the authorities act with total respect for the legal system, but also involves granting the minimum guarantees of due process to all persons who are subject to its jurisdiction, as established in the Convention” (para. 68). In paragraph 71, the Court emphasized that “although the jurisdictional function belongs, in particular, to the Judiciary [...], other public body or authorities may exercise functions of the same type,” and added that, consequently, the expression “competent judge or court” required to “determine” rights referred “to any public authority, whether administrative, legislative or judicial, which, through its decisions determines individual rights and obligations.” The Court concluded this reasoning by stating that “any State body that exercises functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature has the obligation to adopt decisions that are in consonance with the guarantees of due legal process in the terms of Article 8 of the American Convention.” This means that Article 8 is applied when a State body is exercising jurisdictional powers, and it does not appear possible to argue this with regard to an official’s refusal to provide information to a private individual. In keeping with its position, in the Constitutional Court case, the Court proceeded to examine whether the dismissal of the justices, alleged victims in the case, complied with each and every requirement of this article, such as the impartiality, independence and competence of the State body and the right to defense of those affected (considerations, paragraphs 74, 77 and 81 to 84). 5. In the Case of Baena Ricardo et al., the Court stated the same position, because the case was of a similar nature, since it also dealt with the State’s exercise of its powers to sanction (see considerations, paragraphs 124 and 131). In the Case of Ivcher-Bronstein, considerations, paragraph 105, repeats paragraph 171 of the Constitutional Court judgment and establishes as grounds for the violation of Article 8 the impediments that had been placed on the victim to defend himself, such as not informing him that his file had been lost, not allowing him to reconstruct it, not advising him of the charges of which he was accused, or allowing him to present witnesses (considerations, paragraph 106). In the Case of Yatama, the Court repeated its position that Article 8 applied to “procedural bodies” (paragraph 147); it stated that, in this case, the Supreme Electoral Council exercised jurisdictional functions, not only owing to the actions that it executed in this case, but because Nicaraguan legislation described these functions as jurisdictional in nature (paragraph 151). 6. None of the above corresponds to the case we are examining. The act that affected the right of Mr. Claude Reyes et al. was an official’s refusal to allow a private individual access to information; the proceedings used to contest this refusal was the application for protection and this is why we have concurred with the Court in finding a violation of Article 25, because the Chilean appellate court did not comply with the basic tenet for any judicial decision, that it should be justified. 7. However, this conclusion does not imply leaving the right to request access to information to the discretion of the State. The right to petition authorities, established in general in the laws of the countries of the region and certainly in Chile (Article 19(14) of the Chilean Constitution) requires a response from the State, which should be, in the words of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, “clear,

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