29 exclusion causes of the crime.92 A.1) Competence 111. The Tribunal has pointed out that the application of military justice shall be strictly reserved to members of the active military. Hence, the Court has been constant in stating that civilians and “retired military cannot [be] judged by military courts.”93 112. In this case, there is no controversy regarding whether Mr. Usón Ramírez was a Brigadier General of the Venezuelan Armed Forces and that at the time of the facts in this case he was retired (supra para. 36). Also, the Tribunal observes that the trial against Mr. Usón Ramírez in the military forum was based on the following domestic law: 1) the Organic Law of the National Armed Forces of February 22, 1995 (hereinafter the “Organic Law”) and 2) the Organic Code of Military Justice of September 17, 1998 (hereinafter the “Organic Code” or “COJM” ). 113. As regards the legislation governing the jurisdiction of military courts, Article 212 of such Organic Law points out that “all the active members of the National Armed Forces shall be subjected to the military jurisdiction as set forth under the Law.” However, Article 124 of the Organic Code subjects officers94 to the military jurisdiction “independent […] of the status they may have.” In addition, the Court observes that numeral 3 of Article 123 of the Organic Code establishes, inter alia, that the criminal military jurisdiction includes “[t]he military infractions committed by military officials or civilians together or separately.” From the aforementioned, it is not clear that the domestic legislation allows for a retired military member to be subjected to the military jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in the case of Mr. Usón, this matter was decided by military jurisdictional instances which declared differently from what this Tribunal has decided on other occasions (supra para. 108), namely that, military courts were competent to try a retired military member.95 114. As pointed out above, the codification of the crime under Article 505 of the COJM whereby Mr. Usón Ramírez was judgmentd does not limit the active subject to those in active military duty, rather, it includes any individual, either civilians or retired military members, to be subjected to the military jurisdiction (supra para. 38). 115. It is evident from the foregoing that, contrary to the requirements of the American Convention and the jurisprudence of this Court, the domestic legislation applicable to this case extends its jurisdiction to active military service members, but also extends it to civilians and to retired service members. Additionally, the Tribunal observes that even though the State has alleged that, in accordance with domestic law on the matter, retired service members do not cease to be active service members, the State also indicated that 92 Cf. Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 47, para. 126. 93 Cf. Case of Cesti Hurtado v. Perú. Merits. Judgment of September 29, 1999. Series C No. 56, para. 151, and Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 47, para. 139. 94 Article 211 of the Organic Code establishes that “[t]he military personnel are classified in Officials [and other categories].” The Generals of Brigades, according to Article 111 of the same instrument, pertain to the category of “Official Generals.” 95 Cf. Transcript of Hearing of the Second Military Court of First Instance of Caracas on May 24, 2004 (case file of attachments to the petition, tomo II, attachment 53, fs. 1247 a 1252); order of May 27, 2004 of the Second Military Court of First Instance of Caracas, in relation to the request to amplify the measures of preventive deprivation of liberty (case file of attachments to the petition, tomo II, attachment 59, fs. 1352 a 1361), and judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice on June 2, 2005, supra note 22, fs. 1494 a 1557.