was not required, or to provide the reasons for the decision, and this violated the presumption of innocence. Owing to the way in which detención en firme was regulated, in none of the cases was the existence of valid requirements for its admissibility clearly proved and substantiated because the judge was the only authority responsible for assessing its pertinence, and he was not required to justify this. 99. The Court has also corroborated that the case file does not reveal that the authorities reviewed the detención en firme of the presumed victims during their detention. In the instant case, the Court considers that, by maintaining the presumptions for detención en firme owing to the application of the said norm, it was not possible to conduct a periodic review to assess whether the reasons and need for, and the proportionality of, the measure persisted. Consequently, the Court considers that, by failing to conduct a periodic assessment of the precautionary measure imposed, the State violated the personal liberty of the presumed victims in violation of Articles 7(3), 7(5) and 8(2) of the American Convention. 100. The Court also considers that, in addition to having been applied unlawfully in this specific case, the regulation of detención en firme was incompatible with the purposes of the American Convention, because it did not allow an examination of all the presumptions required in order to impose a measure that restricted personal liberty. Consequently, the Court finds that the norms applied in the instant case violated Article 2 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 7 of this instrument. 101. With regard to the Commission’s allegation that the application of this norm entailed a difference in treatment that was contrary to the Convention, the Court notes that article 173-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning detención en firme (supra para. 38), defined two categories: (a) those persons prosecuted for offenses punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, who were not classified as presumed accessories after the fact, and on whom the precautionary measure of detención en firme should be imposed, and (b) those persons prosecuted for offenses punishable by less than one year’s imprisonment, or classified as presumed accessories after the fact, or even without those requirements when the order to initiate a trial had not been issued, and who could be subject to other precautionary measures. This difference in treatment was not based on any legitimate purpose in light of the standards established by the Court to justify the imposition of pre-trial detention and, therefore, it was arbitrary. 102. In the instant case, detención en firme was applied to the presumed victims; therefore, this differentiated treatment cannot be reasonably justified by the Convention-based purposes for coercive measures that entail deprivation of personal liberty.122 The Court notes that the case file does not contain any formal justification or substantiation used by the judicial authority to order the detención en firme of the presumed victims, nor does it contain any justification to maintain this measure; therefore, the presumed victims were subject to a discriminatory and arbitrary restriction of personal liberty. Consequently, the Court considers that the State is responsible for the violation of Articles 7(1), 7(3) and 24 of the American Convention, in relation to the obligations established in Articles 1(1) and 2 of this instrument, to the detriment of Jorge Villarroel Merino, Mario Romel Cevallos Moreno, Jorge Coloma Gaibor, Fernando López Ortiz, Amílcar Ascázubi Albán and Patricio Vinueza Pánchez. also indications that non-custodial measures are “insufficient to ensure his presence at the trial.” 2000 Code of Criminal Procedure, published in the Supplement to Official Record 360 of January 13, 2000, supra. Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits, supra, para. 98, and Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No 129, paras. 135 to 138. 122 27