C. Pre-trial detention 103. The Court recalls that Jorge Coloma Gaibor, Fernando López Ortiz, Amílcar Ascázubi Albán and Patricio Vinueza Pánchez remained deprived of liberty in pre-trial detention for four months from January 27, 2004, to May 25, 2004. Jorge Villarroel Merino remained deprived of liberty until June 4, 2004. Mr. Cevallos Moreno is not included in this analysis because he obtained his liberty on November 13, 2003 (supra para. 55). 104. The Court notes that the decision of January 27, 2004, confirming the pre-trial detention of five of the presumed victims, Messrs. Villarroel Merino, Coloma Gaibor, López Ortiz, Ascázubi Albán and Vinueza Pánchez, was based on article 167 of the CPPPN, and does not explicitly mention article 91 of this code (supra para. 58). The Court also notes that this decision lacks a statement of reasons because the judge merely indicated that the detención en firme of the presumed victims was revoked and confirmed their detention (supra para. 58). This is coherent with paragraph 2 of the said article 91 which does not require the substantiation of pre-trial detention for procedural purposes; rather it is automatically regulated when there are serious indications or presumptions of responsibility. The Court has also noted that, when confirming the detention, the judge failed to assess whether or not the purposes, need and proportionality of the detention subsisted, because he was responsible for evaluating whether or not it was pertinent to maintain it, and this also violated the principle of presumption of innocence. 105. In addition, the Court recalls that Article 7(5) of the Convention requires that a person detained must be “brought before a judge,” which means that the authority should hear the detainee in person and assess all the explanations provided by the latter in order to decide whether it is appropriate to release him or to maintain the deprivation of liberty.123 The judge in this case did not exercise direct judicial control because he merely changed the detención en firme to pre-trial detention. Also, the failure to substantiate the decision prevented the defense from knowing the reasons why the pre-trial detention was maintained. 106. Therefore, the Court considers that, in this case, given that the judge prolonged the deprivation of liberty without exercising direct control of the detention and without providing sufficient reasons to justify it, this constituted an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence to the detriment of Messrs. Villarroel Merino, Coloma Gaibor, López Ortiz, Ascázubi Albán and Vinueza Pánchez, in violation of Articles 7(1), 7(3), 7(5) and 8(2) of the American Convention. D. Conclusion 107. Based on all the foregoing, the Court concludes that the deprivation of liberty ordered in the form of detención en firme was unlawful and arbitrary in violation of personal liberty, and also the principles of presumption of innocence and equality before the law. While the detención en firme was in force, the judge failed to assess the purpose, appropriateness, necessity and proportionality of the detention. Consequently, the Court finds that the State violated the rights established in Articles 7(1), 7(2), 7(3), 7(5), 8(2) and 24 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of this instrument, to the detriment of Jorge Villarroel Merino, Mario Romel Cevallos Moreno, Jorge Coloma Gaibor, Fernando López Ortiz, Amílcar Ascázubi Albán and Patricio Vinueza Pánchez. 108. Furthermore, the Court finds that the State is responsible for failing to assess the purpose, appropriateness, necessity and proportionality of the pre-trial detention because, when prolonging the deprivation of liberty, the judge did not exercise direct control of the detention or provide a Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Iñiguez v. Ecuador, supra, para. 85, and Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014. Series C No. 289, para. 129. 123 28