5 16. Regarding the requests for a public hearing, filed before the Court by Mr. Cesti (supra 8 and 9), the Court deems it appropriate to specify that the purpose of the hearing, proposed by the victim, is not directly related to interpretation of the judgment, but rather to the phase of compliance with the judgment on the merits, and that the Court has given the parties the opportunity to file whatever written pleadings they believe are important. Therefore, pursuant to article 39 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, it does not consider that the request referred to here is in order. VI SCOPE OF THE REPARATIONS Pleadings by Mr. Cesti 17. In his request for interpretation, Mr. Cesti Hurtado stated that the purpose of the indemnification ordered by the Court in its judgment on reparations is that “the State must fully reimburse the amount of material damages caused, which are a direct consequence of the human rights violation”. In this context, he pointed out that the State must pay a just indemnification covering all material damages caused, and he stated that “to carry out an effective legal defense, […] he incurred in considerable expenses, which were detrimental to his assets, and which resulted from the State’s actions” and that, therefore, this should be the interpretation of the fist operative point of the judgment. 18. Mr. Cesti also stated that “it is his understanding that point No. 1 of the operative part of the judgment on reparations, in accordance with paragraphs 46 and 47 of that judgment, should be interpreted as meaning that the income the victim did not receive, whether from salaries […] or dividend […], as well as any other legitimate income derived from the normal activities which both he and his firm carried out, are part of the material damages which the State must indemnify”, because the “income of the victim did not only include his remuneration as an employee or functionary of the family firm, but also the profits of that firm which depended almost exclusively on his professional activity”. 19. Likewise, he pointed out that the reference in the judgment on reparations to the amount of indemnification being determined by mechanisms established in domestic legislation, “cannot be interpreted as the right of the State to unilaterally determine the amount of damage caused [but rather that] it entails a bilateral procedure in which, based on the general principles stated in the judgment on reparations and the spirit of that judgment, the parties determine by mutual agreement […] the amount of the corresponding indemnification”. He also stated that determination of the amount to be paid for moral damages and payment of same cannot be delayed more than 6 months. 20. Finally, as regards the procedure to determine the amount of indemnification, Mr. Cesti considered that “the State must indemnify, with no further procedures, all material damages duly demonstrated by the victim in this case [and that] the State must effect the payment […] without improper delays, as soon as possible”. He added that if necessary, the Court itself might be asked to determine the amount of indemnification to be paid for material damages. Pleadings by the Commission