10 alleged, issue that must not be analyzed as a preliminary matter but when assessing the merits of the controversy. 26. Therefore, the Tribunal understands that the State's right to defense has not been affected and thus finds no reason to depart from the prior decision made in the proceeding before the Commission. Consequently, the State’s lack of specificity in a timely procedural manner before the Commission regarding the domestic remedies that allegedly had not been exhausted, as well as the lack of reasoning put forth concerning their availability, suitability, and effectiveness, make the argument presented before this Court time-barred. 27. Lastly, it is worth emphasizing that the State made a partial acknowledgment of international responsibility (infra Chapter VI), in which it specified and admitted that Mr. Vélez Loor was not notified of the content of Order 7306 of December 6, 2002, and that the process by which he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment was conducted without any guarantee of the right to defense. In this respect, the Tribunal deems that the filing of the preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in the present case is incompatible with said acknowledgment,18 with the understanding that the notice of said decision constituted a requisite for the filing of some of the remedies mentioned by the State in its response19 and that the lack of guarantee of due process of law to pursue the remedies constitutes an enabling factor of the jurisdiction of the international system of protection. 28. Therefore, in virtue of these reasons, the Court dismisses the first preliminary objection raised by the State. 2. Lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Court over an alleged breach of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture a) Arguments of the Parties i. Arguments of the State 29. The State requested that the inadmissibility of the application submitted by the Commission be declared, in view of the “lack of the Court’s competence […] to hear the alleged non-compliance with the obligation to investigate established in the [Convention against Torture], based on the content of Articles 33 and 62 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which expressly limit the Court's jurisdiction to the interpretation or application of the [latter].” In this respect, the State alleged that “it cannot be assumed that the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the American Convention by the Panamanian State […] could be applied to [confer] jurisdiction upon the Court regarding the application and interpretation of the Convention [against Torture], without considering that such assumption constitutes an act contrary to the principle of consent.” In the same manner, it pointed out that this Tribunal is not competent to hear violations of the obligations contained in the Convention against Torture in the present case given that the State, apart from giving its consent to be bound to such treaty, must expressly state and accept the competence of the Inter-American Court to apply and interpret its content. Finally, the State argued that the Court has limited jurisdiction over international treaties 18 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripan Massacre” v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of March 7, 2005 Series C No. 122, para. 30, and Case of the Ituango Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2006 Series C No. 148, para. 104. 19 In fact, the State pointed out that even though “[t]he resolution by which it was ordered the deportation of Mr. Vélez Loor was subject to the request for reconsideration and appeal before the Ministry of Interior and Justice, the National Office of Immigration and Naturalization failed to formally notified the content of the Resolution, therefore it is possible to infer that the petitioner was not, at the moment of the implementation of the resolution, reported of the remedies or in a position to file said remedies”.