20 particular circumstances of the specific case, and the attitude and position of the parties,43 in order to determine, insofar as possible and in the exercise of its competence, the truth of what occurred in the case. 64. The Court notes that the State did not clearly and specifically detail the facts of the application that serve as the legal basis for its partial acknowledgment of responsibility. However, it is verified that the State explicitly objected to certain facts mentioned in the application.44 Therefore, given that the State acquiesced to the alleged violations of Articles 7(1), 7(3), 7(4), 7(5), 5(1), 5(2), 8(1), and 8(2) (b), (c), (d), and (f) of the American Convention, in relation to the obligation established in Article 1(1) therein, this Tribunal finds that Panama has acknowledged the facts that, according to the application -factual framework of this proceeding-, constitute these violations, with the exception of the Articles above mentioned. 65. In view of the foregoing, the Tribunal decides to accept the acknowledgment made by the State and to classify it as a partial acknowledgment of facts and a partial acquiescence to the legal claims contained in the application of the Inter-American Commission. 66. Regarding Article 25 of the Convention, the Court finds that it cannot be inferred from the acquiescence made by the State the precise scope of its acknowledgment,45 given that the State itself declared that there is still dispute over the right to recourse to a competent judge or court in order for the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention (Article 7(6)); the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court (Article 8(2)(h)), and the right to judicial protection (Article 25), all of the American Convention. 67. In sum, the Court notes that there is still controversy between the parties as to the alleged violation of:     Article 7(2) and 7(5) of the American Convention with respect to the initial detention for not having put Mr. Vélez Loor before a judge or a competent authority to exercise judiciary functions and for not having notified, in writing, of the requirements to exit the country; Article 7(3) of the American Convention in relation to the order of detention N° 1430 of November 12, 2002; Article 7(3) of the American Convention in relation to the punishment imposed by means of Order 7306 of December 6, 2002; Article 7(4) of the American Convention in relation to the notification provided to Mr. Vélez Loor concerning the right to consular assistance; 43 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Series C No. 177, para. 24; Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña, supra note 28, para. 34, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al., supra note 27, para. 22. 44 The State objected to “the statement made in the application of the Inter-American Commission according to which Mr. Vélez Loor did not have access to a counsel provided by the State and that he was not afforded the possibility of contacting the Ecuadorian [C]onsulate,” and “to the fact regarding the lack of specialized medical care that Mr. Vélez required in light of the alleged cranial fracture he had”. It sustained that “it is not true that a request for deportation has been presented to the [National Office of Immigration] by the Ombudsman’s Office in favor of Mr. Vélez Loor”; it is “not exact the statement made according to which the Ecuadorian consulate heard, only in the month February, about the request for the payment of tickets to obtain the commutation of the sentence imposed on Vélez Loor” and that “it denies the fact alleged regarding the lack of investigation into the acts of torture denounced by the petitioner.” 45 In this respect, in its response to the application, the State indicated: “[e]ven though the State has acknowledged partial responsibility for the non-compliance with its duty to provide judicial guarantees regarding the punishment imposed on Mr. Vélez Loor, it has not accepted responsibility for the violation of the obligation to provide effective recourse before the courts (judicial control) to protect him before acts that, in breach of the domestic legal system, violated the petitioner’s right.”