33 gender, or any other reason.94 Likewise, the evolution of this aspect of international law has placed certain limits on the application of migratory policies that must always be applied with strict regard for the guarantees of due process and respect for human dignity,95 whatever the legal situation of the migrant may be. 101. Based on the foregoing, the Court considers pertinent to make a differentiated analysis in relation to the different acts and moments at which the personal liberty of Mr. Vélez Loor was restricted, according to the arguments presented by the parties and regarding which the State has not accepted its international responsibility. To that end, the Court shall refer to the following issues: a) the initial arrest by the Tupiza Police on November 11, 2002; b) Arrest Warrant 1430 of November 12, 2002; c) effective remedies to challenge the lawfulness of the detention; d) the proceeding before the National Office of Immigration and Naturalization from November 12 to December 6, 2002; e) the right to information and effective access to consular assistance; f) deprivation of liberty under the terms of Article 67 of Decree Law 16 of 1960; g) notification of Order 7306 of December 6, 2002 and remedies regarding the punitive ruling; h) and, the illegality of placing sanctioned foreigners in centers of the national prison system pursuant to Decree Law 16 of 1960. a) Initial arrest by the Tupiza Police on November 11, 2002 102. The representatives alleged that, given that Mr. Vélez Loor was never placed at the disposal of the National Director of Migration and never received a written notification of the conditions necessary to leave the country, the arrest was not legal and therefore, it was contrary to Article 7(2) of the Convention. Likewise, the representatives sustained that Mr. Vélez Loor was never taken before a judge to exercise judicial control over the terms and conditions of his arrest. Therefore, they requested the Court to declare that Mr. Vélez Loor was not taken before a competent judge after his arrest and that the judge did not exercise an effective judicial control over the arrest made in violation of Article 7(5) of the Convention. 103. Following this line of thought, the Commission sustained that “[e]ven though Vélez Loor would have been taken before the National Office of Immigration and Naturalization, the violation of Article 7(5) of the Convention remained intact due to the fact that said authority is not a judicial authority nor exercises judicial functions.” In addition, in the ten months during which Mr. Vélez Loor was held in custody of the Panamanian State, he was never brought before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power; therefore, the administrative detention ordered on November 12, 2002, did not comply with any judicial control. 104. The State contested these arguments by alleging that, on the day following his arrest, Mr. Vélez Loor was physically brought before the competent immigration authority for the verification of his immigration status and for the application of the corresponding legal measures; and, at that moment, he was informed of the reasons for his arrest, he was heard by the officer in charge of the National Office of Immigration in Metetí, who verified the non-compliance with the legal requirements for the entry of Mr. Vélez into Panama. 94 95 Cf. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, supra note 82, para. 118. Cf. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, supra note 82, para. 119. Likewise, the African Commission of Human Rights and Peoples has pointed out that " [...] [The Commission] does not wish to call into question nor is it calling into question the right of any State to take legal action against illegal immigrants such as deport them to their countries of origin, if the competent courts so decide. It is however of the view that it is unacceptable to deport individuals without giving them the possibility to plead their case before the competent national courts as this is contrary to the spirit and letter of the [African] Charter [of Human Rights and Peoples] and international law.” African Commission of Human and Peoples´ Rights, Communication No: 159/96- Union Inter Africaine des Droits de l’Homme, Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, Rencontre Africaine des Droits de l’Homme, Organisation Nationale des Droits de l’Homme au Sénégal and Association Malienne des Droits de l’Homme au Angola, decision of November, 11, 1997, para. 20.