54 the latter has or may have recourse. For a true review of the judgment, in the sense required by the Convention, the higher court must have the jurisdictional authority to take up the particular case in question.189 In this respect, while States have a margin of discretion in regulating the exercise of that remedy, they may not establish restrictions or requirements that infringe upon the very essence of the right to appeal a judgment. The possibility of “appealing the judgment” must be accessible, without allowing for the kind of complex formalities that would render this right illusory.190 180. In the instant case, the Tribunal deems it is inadmissible that Order 7306 of December 6, 2002, issued by the National Office of Immigration, by means of which Mr. Vélez Loor was deprived of liberty for almost ten months, had not been notified, as the State itself acknowledged (supra para. 60). The Court finds that the lack of notification constitutes, per se, a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, given that it placed Mr. Vélez Loor in a situation of uncertainty regarding his legal situation and made the exercise of the right to appeal a judgment unfeasible. As a consequence, the Court considers that this case is framed within a situation of factual impediment to ensure a real access to the right to appeal, and within a situation of lack of guarantees and judicial insecurity as well; therefore, it is not appropriate to analyze the remedies mentioned by the State. It is neither necessary to analyze the argument of the State regarding the Ombudsman’s Office as a non-judicial remedy, given that such Office does not satisfy the requirement of a reviewing judicial higher body, as well as the requirement of a liberal remedy that would permit a thorough analysis or examination of all the issues debated and analyzed before the authority that issued the act subject to appeal. Therefore, it is not a remedy that the people must necessarily seek. 181. Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal declares that Panama violated the right of Mr. Vélez Loor recognized in Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) therein. h) Lack of legality of the place of incarceration of aliens punished by application of Decree Law 16 of 1960 182. The State sustained that “[t]he legality of placing aliens punished by application of Article 67 of Decree Law 16 of 1960 in centers of the national penitentiary system was based, not only on the content of the norm itself, but also on the interpretation that the Supreme Court of Justice has made regarding the legality of such measure.” 183. Under the rule of law, the principles of legality and non-retroactivity govern the actions of all bodies of the State in their respective fields of competence, particularly when the exercise of its punitive power is at issue.191 The Tribunal has already ruled on the application of Article 9 of the Convention to the administrative punitive action. In this respect, it has held that “for the sake of legal security, it is indispensable for the punitive rule, whether of a criminal or an administrative nature, to exist and to be known or to offer the possibility to be known, before the action or omission that violate it and for which punishment is intended occurs. The definition of an act as an unlawful act, and the determination of its legal effects must precede the conduct of the subject being regarded as a violator. Otherwise, individuals would not be able to orient their behavior according to a valid and true legal order within which 189 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 151, para. 161; Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Perú. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, para. 192, and Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 187, para. 159. 190 191 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 187, paras. 161 and 164. Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al., supra note 139, para. 107; Case of Yvon Neptune, supra note 97, para. 125, and Case García Asto and Ramírez Rojas, supra note 99, para. 187.