16 arguments shall be analyzed by the Court in the merits of this Judgment (infra Chapter VII-3). 51. Therefore, the Tribunal partially accepts the first preliminary matter to the proceeding filed by the State. 2. The legal standing of CEJIL to act on behalf of the alleged victim regarding the alleged violations of the obligations embodied in the Convention against Torture. 52. The State alleged that CEJIL does not have legal standing “to act at [this] stage [...] on behalf of the alleged victim [...] regarding the alleged violations of the obligations embodied in the [Convention against Torture],” based on that the powerof-attorney granted by Mr. Vélez Loor authorizes CEJIL to “represent him […] only in relation to the violation of ‘some rights enshrined in the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (sic)’ and not to represent him as to the alleged violations [...] contained in other international conventions.” 53. The representatives argued that the granted powers-of-attorney complies with all the formalities that the Court has previously determined to be essential and “unequivocally demonstrates [the will of the alleged victim] for CEJIL to take all the actions and measures related to the proceeding […] conducted against the State […] ‘ensuring the correct processing of said case’”; therefore, the power-of-attorney is valid and effective in relation to all the pertinent actions within the framework of this proceeding. For its part, the Commission did not present specific considerations in this regard. 54. Previously, the Court has stated that it is not essential that the power of attorney granted by the alleged victims to be represented in the proceeding before the Court conform to the same formalities established by the domestic laws of the respondent State.38 The Court has further stated that the usual practice of this Court in regard to the rules of representation has been flexible. However, it has certain limits dictated by the use that the representation itself will have. First, the instruments must clearly identify the party bestowing the power of attorney and reflect a lucid and unambiguous manifestation of free will. They must also name the person to whom the power of attorney is granted and, finally, they must specifically state the purpose of the representation. The instruments that meet these requirements are valid and have full effect once submitted before the Tribunal.39 55. The Court verifies that the power of attorney granted to CEJIL40 does not contain any express limitation on the Articles that may be alleged by the representatives in the proceeding before this Court, given that the American Convention was mentioned in a general way; moreover, an intention to limit the authority or capacity of the representatives in the proceedings before this Tribunal cannot be inferred from the draft of the said instrument. On the contrary, in the said power of attorney it is expressed that the attorneys must “ensure the correct 38 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Perú. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 42, paras. 97 and 98; Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al. v. Perú. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of February 7, 2006. Series C No. 144, para. 145, and Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127, para. 94. 39 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo, supra note 38, paras. 98 and 99; Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al., supra note 38, para. 145, and Case of Yatama, supra note 38, para. 94. 40 Cf. Special power-of–attorney granted by Jesús Tranquilino Vélez Loor in favor of the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) through Mrs. Viviana Krsticevic and Marcela Martino by means of deed N° 367/2009 of April 29, 2009 (case file of the evidence, volume III, annex 33 to the application, folios 1544 to 1545).