44 foreign person, even when said person is a migrant in an irregular situation, may exercise his or her rights and defend his or her interests effectively and in full procedural equality with other triable individuals.145 144. It is an acknowledged fact that, since there was no specific regulation of Decree Law 16 of 1960, its substantiation was subject to the procedure established in Law 38 of 2000, related to administrative procedures in general.146 That is to say, it was necessary to resort to supplemental norms. In this respect, the procedure that resulted in the punitive administrative act by which Mr. Vélez Loor was deprived of liberty, was not only decided inaudita parte (supra para. 60) but also it did not offer the possibility of exercising the right to defense, to a hearing or to adversarial proceedings’ safeguards, as part of the guarantees of due process of law, leaving the arrested migrant to the absolute discretion of the punishing power of the National Office of Immigration. In fact, the State "accept[ed] responsibility [given that] the accused received no written and detailed formal communication regarding the charges brought against him; Mr. Vélez was not given time or adequate means to prepare his defense; Mr. Vélez was not assisted by a counsel; he was also not permitted to exercise his right to defense during the substantiation of the administrative procedure that resulted in the deprivation of his liberty.” 145. Furthermore, the Court has sustained that the right to defense binds the State to treat the person, at all times, as a true party to the proceeding, in the broadest sense of this concept and not simply as an object thereof.147 Article 8(2)(d) and (e) establish the right of the accused to defend himself or herself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his or her own choosing, and, if the accused does not so chose, the accused has the inalienable right to be assisted by a counsel provided by the State, paid or not as the domestic law provides. In this respect and for cases concerning non-criminal procedures, the Tribunal has previously established that “the circumstances of a particular case or proceeding—its significance, its legal character, and its context in a particular legal system—are among the factors that bear on the determination of whether legal representation is or is not necessary for due process.”148 146. The Court has considered that, in the administrative or judicial instances, where decisions may be taken by which an accused may be deported, expelled, or deprived of freedom, the provision of free public legal aid service is necessary to avoid the violation of the right to due process.149 In fact, in cases like the instant case, in which the consequence of the immigration procedures could be the 145 Cf. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the due Process of Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999. Series A No. 16, para. 117 and 119; and Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, supra note 82, para. 121, and Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of June 21, 2002. Series C No. 94, para. 146. 146 In this respect, the State pointed out that “[a]s administrative act, Resolution [7306] was subject, in first instance, to the General Administrative Procedure contained in Law 38 of July 31, 2000, a rule that governs the administrative activity of the State and establishes with the utmost clarity the remedies for the annulment and reversal of unlawful administrative acts.” See also, Statement rendered by María Cristina González at the public hearing held before the Inter-American Court on August 25, 2010 and Law N° 38 of July 31, 2000 that approves the Organic Statutes of the Administration’s Office, regulates the General Administrative Procedure and stipulates the Special Provisions published in the Official Gazette on August 2, 2000 (case file of the evidence, volume VII, annex 9 of the response to the application, folio 2792 to 2855). 147 Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, supra note 96, para. 29. 148 Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Articles 46.1, 46.2.a) and 46.2.b) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990. Series A N.11 para. 28. 149 Cf. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, supra note 82, para. 126.