102 209. As a result of the order of preventive detention, Mr. Palamara-Iribarne was deprived of his liberty on March 16, 1993, and remained in custody until March 26, 1993, when he was released on bail as ordered by the Court-Martial three days earlier, on March 23, 1993 (supra paras. 63(31) and 63(35)). 210. The military authorities who ordered his preventive detention and denied his request to be released on bail in Case No. 464 (supra paras. 63(27) and 63(29)) relied on Article 361(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as legal grounds for the measure, which provision required that detention be essential to ensure the successful completion of specific steps of the investigation. Said authorities merely cited the article, without providing grounds therefor or evidence of the facts of the case that would show that the statutory requirements had been met. 211. Furthermore, it is the Court’s view that the preventive detention of Mr. Palamara-Iribarne in Case No. 464, referred to in the preceding paragraph, was not essential in order for the Naval Prosecutor to be able to carry out the pending steps of the proceeding, considering that these consisted in taking the statement of Mr. Palamara-Iribarne’s direct superior, sending an official communication to the General Staff to confirm whether “any sort of prior authorization had been processed in connection with the publication of the book ‘Ética y Servicios de Inteligencia’ (‘Ethics and Intelligence Services’)” and the filing of a certificate of existence and criminal record of the accused (supra paras. 63(24), 63(27) and 63(29)). It should be noted that, given the secret nature of the preliminary investigation stage of the proceeding, Mr. Palamara-Iribarne could not possibly hinder completion of such steps. 212. In cases subject to Chilean military jurisdiction, preventive detention is apparently the rule, not an exception. The provisions of the Code of Military Justice and the Code of Criminal Procedure that applied to Mr. Palamara-Iribarne and which govern preventive detention show that, in issuing the writ of indictment, the court may release the defendant from prison without imposing any bail, provided that the “crime with which defendant has been charged only carries a fine sentence or a sentence that entails the deprivation of rights, or a custodial or semi-custodial sentence for a term not in excess of a minimum term of imprisonment.” Put differently, release on bail is a “privilege” that the court may grant the defendant when certain statutory requirements are met, starting from the premise of detention as the rule. 213. The interpretation of the domestic legal provisions drawn by the military authorities in the instant case caused a precautionary measure restrictive of personal liberty not to be exceptional in nature as required by the Convention. On the contrary, by ordering preventive detention without taking due consideration of the legal and conventional elements required therefor, the State violated Mr. PalamaraIribarne’s right to the presumption of innocence since, as evidenced by the facts of the instant case, it did not overturn the presumption through sufficient evidence of the requirements allowing his liberty to be restricted (supra para. 198 in fine). In this regard, expert witness Horvitz stated that a person’s indictment under the rules of military criminal procedure “automatically” leads to “temporary detention pending trial in the case of serious and less serious crimes.”