68 statements made by Mr. Palamara-Iribarne arouse interest in the press and, as a result, among the public. 83. Democratic checks and balances, exercised by society through public opinion, encourage transparency in State activities and promote accountability of public officials for their administration. This is why there should be more tolerance and openness to criticism, in the face of statements and opinions advanced by individuals in the exercise of said democratic mechanism.181 This is applicable to officers and members of the Navy, including those who preside over courts. Moreover, said democratic mechanism of checks and balances promotes greater participation among people in matters of social interest. 84. Therefore, as stated by the Court, in the case of public officials, individuals who perform public services, politicians, and government institutions a different threshold of protection should be applied, which is not based on the specific individual, but on the fact that the activities or conduct of a certain individual is of public interest;182 in this particular case, the conduct of the Office of the Prosecutor in the military proceedings against the alleged victim. 85. The Court has pointed out that the “necessity” and, therefore, the legality of the restrictions on freedom of expression based on Article 13(2) of the American Convention will depend on whether they are designed to fulfill an overriding public interest. Among the options available to achieve such purpose, that which is less restrictive of the protected right should be chosen. Given this standard, it is not sufficient to prove, for example, that the law serves a useful or suitable purpose. To be compatible with the Convention, the restrictions must be justified on the basis of collective purposes that, given their importance, clearly override the social need for the full enjoyment of the right protected by Article 13 of the Convention, and must not restrict, beyond what is strictly necessary, the right enshrined therein. In other words, the restriction must be proportionate to the underlying interest and in direct furtherance of such legitimate purpose, interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of the right to freedom of thought and expression.183 86. In this regard, in message No. 212-347 regarding the introduction of the bill subsequently enacted into Law No. 20,048, the President of Chile stated that “the offense of contempt […] does not seem to be a legitimate restriction on the freedoms of thought, opinion and information,” and that “that the existence of these provisions […] has degraded into an unjustified privilege […] for the benefit of certain [public 181 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 172, para. 97; Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 174, para. 127; Case of Ivcher- Bronstein, supra note 173, para. 155. In this regard, Feldek v. Slovakia, no. 29032/95, § 83, ECHR 2001-VIII; and Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey, nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94, § 60, ECHR Judgment of 8 July, 1999. 182 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 172, para. 103; Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 174, para. 129; and Case of Ivcher-Bronstein, supra note 173, para. 155. 183 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 172, para. 96; Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 174, paras. 121 and 123; and Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, supra note 172, para. 46.