88 under his command. 152. The second instance in peacetime is exercised “by an Army, Air Force, and Police Force Court-Martial” based in Santiago, and by “a Navy Court-Martial, based in Valparaíso.” The Navy Court-Martial is made up of two Members of the Court of Appeals of Valparaíso, appointed annually by drawing lots, the Navy Judge Advocate General, and a Navy active-duty General Officer. Since 1991 the tenure of the last two above-mentioned officers has been for three years, during which they cannot be removed from their positions. The Court-Martial is competent to hear appeals regarding the judgments rendered by naval courts and the writs of amparo [protection of constitutional guarantees and rights] filed in favor of persons detained or arrested as a result of an order issued by a military authority. As opposed to naval courts of first instance, judges sitting on Courts-Martial have received legal education. Notwithstanding, the military members who sit on Courts-Martial are hierarchically subordinate to higher-ranked military commanders. 153. The highest military instance in peacetime is the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile based in Santiago, which, when hearing an appeal regarding a decision taken by a lower military court, such as Institutional Courts or Courts-Martial, adds an Army Judge Advocate to its composition. 154. Prosecutors, who exercise the military jurisdiction, are lawyers and “their [military] rank is lower than that of judges and judges advocate.” “Prosecutors are the authorities who start and conduct criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the military courts in first instance.” The prosecutor conducts the preliminary investigation into the criminal offense and “is empowered to issue, within the context of the proceedings, personal precautionary measures such as preventive detention” or “intrusive measures,” which may affect the fundamental rights of the accused. Prosecutors must gather and deposit all pertinent items of evidence, arrest the accused persons, and forward all the evidence relevant to the case. 155. The Court deems that the organic structure and composition of military courts as described in the foregoing paragraphs implies that, in general, they are made up of active-duty military members who are hierarchically subordinate to higher-ranked officers through the chain of command, that their designation does not depend on their professional skills and qualifications to exercise judicial functions, that they do not have sufficient guarantees that they will not be removed, and that they have not received the legal education required to sit as judges or serve as prosecutors. All this implies that said courts lack independence and impartiality. 156. Regarding the necessity that a military judge or court meets the requirements of independence and impartiality, it has to be recalled what has been decided by the Court in that in a democratic State such conditions must be guaranteed “as to any judge [or court]. The independence of any judge presumes that his appointment is the result of the appropriate process, that his position has a fixed term during which he will not be removed, and that there are guarantees against external pressures.”197 This has also been endorsed by the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of 197 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court. Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 71, para. 75.