2. Analysis of the case 84. The Commission observes that in this case two proceedings were activated: the judicial action for protection and the proceeding before the Superintendency of Health. The IACHR will analyze the effectiveness of the remedies, the reasoning for the rulings, and how they relate to the best interests of the child. 85. The Commission notes that the protection action was filed for alleged violations of the rights to property, life and humane treatment. Therefore, the moment the mother and father had recourse to the law courts there were obstacles to directly arguing the violations of the right to health analyzed in this report, given that under Article 20 of the Constitution of Chile, actions for protection in matters related to the right to health—governed by Article 19, paragraph 9—are admissible with respect to the right to choose the health system; the protection action does not apply to the right to social security governed by paragraph 18 of the same article. In this regard, the Commission does not consider that the protection action was suitable to hear allegations related to the right to health, which in this case went beyond the revision of contractual conditions. The content of the decision of the CSJ, which makes no reference to the implications of the Isapre’s decision for Martina’s rights to health and social security, reflects of that situation. 86. However, as the State has indicated, a specially designed remedy exists for matters related to the coverage of the Isapres before the Superintendency, which includes an evidentiary stage and a hearing for the better cognizance of the judge-arbitrator. The Commission finds that, the judge-arbitrator does indeed have the power not only to decide under the standards in force, resolve not only in application of the current regulations, but also to pass sentence with a measure of discretion and on the basis of sound judgment. Therefore, the IACHR considers that although the process is not designed to declare a violation of the right to health, since it is confined to contractual analysis and the right to property, from the actions of the petitioners in the proceedings, the Commission finds that information was put forward and evidence was adduced in relation to the right to health. In this regard, the Commission observes that the favorable outcome of this remedy for Martina was due to the fortune of having had a judge-arbitrator who, in exercising his discretion, took the right to health into account, but it was not the result of a system adequately designed for such purposes. 87. As for the reasoning for the judgments, the Commission was struck by how the CSJ narrowmindedly determined automatically that, inasmuch as the Isapre concluded that the disease was chronic and that chronicity was stipulated in the Circular No. 7 as a cause for the withdrawing RHD, then it was right to confirm that decision. In this regard, the Commission considers that while the reasoning is ostensibly objective—given the legality of the decision bearing in mind Circular No. 7, under international standards on the rights to health and social security, which must be assessed with particular care where children and persons with disabilities are concerned, the State was supposed to analyze the specific case taking into account whether restricting RHD based on the chronicity of a disease was compatible with the girl’s right to the health and the best interests. Likewise, in finding the removal of RHD to be lawful, the CSJ should also have evaluated the unprotected state in which Martina would be left and the role of the State in compensating for possible medical services that would no longer be covered by private insurance but were necessary for her particular health condition. All those fundamental aspects are absent from the decision of the CSJ. 88. At the same time, although the decision of the Superintendency reinstated RHD for Martina, that decision was based solely on the cost-benefit of its withdrawal for the Isapre. Thus, the reasoning of the judge-arbitrator was founded on the fact that if RHD was removed, Martina would eventually be admitted to the hospital assigned by the insurer. In that connection, since the hospital was not equipped for a long-term stay, Martina would have had to be transferred to another health facility farther away, increasing the costs for the Isapre; therefore, in this specific case the judge-arbitrator concluded that although Martina’s illness was chronic, the provisions of Circular No. 7 could be set aside and RHD reinstated. As in the previous case, the Commission considers that there is also no reasoning addressing the tension between the chronicity cause contained in Circular No. 7 and the best interests of the Martina in relation to her rights to health and social security. Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that if a new hospital space were created with the capacity to admit Martina for a longer period, she would lose the treatment in dispute, since its grant was not 19