11 40. Finally, the third statement of Mr. Barreto Leiva, rendered, once again, before the Substantiation Court of the SCJ on December 15, 1993, was “informative”,35 he was not sworn in and he was not advised of his right against self-incrimination.36 41. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that in the first statement, Mr. Barreto Leiva was being investigated by the CSPA; in the second statement before the Substantiation Court of the SCJ, he testified as a witness and in the third statement before the same court, his status changed again into person being investigated. Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 28 to 30 supra, he was entitled, in the first and in the last statement, at least, to the right enshrined in Article 8(2)(b) of the Convention. The Court shall now analyze whether the State complied with this obligation. 42. In that regard, Venezuela asserted that Prior to the issuance of the arrest warrant against Mr. Barreto Leiva, this is, on May 18, 1994, it was not possible to notify him of the inquiries or charges that may be filed at that time, nor could he have access to the case file, by virtue of the secrecy of the proceedings It was during the inquiries that Mr. Barreto Leiva was formally joined to the proceedings, and as a result, the arrest warrant was issued against him; from that moment onwards, Mr. Barreto Leiva had full access to the court file and was assisted by legal counsels of his choosing (emphasis added in the text). 43. Furthermore, the State asserted that “the reasons and causes of the controversy were publicly discussed at the National Congress for several months, which is why Mr. Barreto Leiva cannot hold that he did not know of the charges filed against him". 44. It is worth mentioning, as a result, that the State accepts that it did not inform Mr. Barreto Leiva of the facts attributed to him before he appeared before the courts. Therefore, it is appropriate to analyze whether the reasons given by the State are sufficient to justify such omission. 45. It is reasonable that, in certain cases, there is secrecy of the proceedings conducted during the preliminary investigation in a criminal case, in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the administration of justice. It falls upon the State the power to open a court file in the search for truth of the facts, adopting the measures necessary to impede that such work be affected by the elimination or withholding of evidence. However, such power must be reconciled with the right to defense of the person being investigated, which entails, inter alia, the possibility to learn about the facts attributed to him. 46. The transition between “person being investigated” and “accused” – and, on occasions, even "convicted"- may occur at any time. It is not possible to wait until the person is formally accused or- as in the instant case- deprived of liberty to provide him with the information that is essential for the timely exercise of the right to defense. 47. The fact that Mr. Barreto Leiva would have learnt, by the media or by his previous statement before the Congress (supra para. 32) about the investigation that was being conducted, does not release the State from complying with the provision of Article 8(2).b of the Convention. The person being investigated, before rendering 35 Cf. summons for Mr. Barreto Leiva issued by the Substantiation Court of the Supreme Court of Justice on December 14, 1993 (records of appendices to the application, Volume I, appendix 8, page 268). 36 Cf. statement of Mr. Barreto Leiva before the Substantiation Court of the Supreme Court of Justice on December 15, 1993 (records of appendices to the application, Volume I, appendix 9, page 270). Even, on this occasion, Mr. Barreto indicated, conscious of his status as person being investigated, “although I personally and morally regret the change to being classified as an accused person".