9 punishment was that provided for murder, as it is presumed that a forcedly disappeared detainee has been murdered and that, therefore, said punishment should be imposed on the defendants. The Commission made no comments on this matter. 32. That the State pointed out that “[i]t is clear from the order rendered [by the first instance judge] that it lacked sufficient justification [regarding] the crimes of which the defendants had been accused and convicted[, and that] no justification has been offered either for the crime of forced disappearance.” During the private hearing (supra Having Seen No. 11,) the State mentioned that “[a] second decision [which] should be grounded on the circumstances giving rise to the appeal and on public order issues is still pending […,]” so not necessarily the punishments imposed by the first instance judge, according to the State, will prevail. 33. That the Court notes that in the appeal decision, the Civil Division (supra Having Seen No. 12) considered that, due to the fact that the proceedings were instituted in 1999, the crime should not be defined as forced disappearance of persons, “because the Law should not be applied retroactively,” and this crime was introduced in the Criminal Code now in force by Law No. 3326 of […] January 18, 2006, in compliance with the requirements of the judgment of the Inter-American Court […]” The Civil Division further notes in the decision that the defendants were “charged with the crimes of unlawful deprivation of freedom, ill-treatment and torture, criminal association, criminal organization, murder and crime concealment[,] and aiding and abetting […]” 34. That this Court has asserted that the prohibition of forced disappearance of persons and the corollary duty to investigate it and punish those responsible for it are regulations that “have reached a nature of jus cogens.”10 35. That the case law of this Court, the orders of other international bodies and organizations, as well as other international instruments and treaties, such as the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Forced Disappearance of 1992, the InterAmerican Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons of 1994 (hereinafter, the “IACFDP”), and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons against Forced Disappearance of 2006, provide for certain standards applicable to the investigation and the prosecution of this type of offenses.11 36. That vis-à-vis the urgent need to prevent forced disappearance cases from remaining unpunished, this Court recalls that it is imperative to use all criminal available resources in furtherance of protecting the fundamental rights that might have been infringed in those cases.12 In light of the foregoing, the Court considers it convenient to highlight that in its first rulings13 it has identified the forced disappearance of persons as an illegal act of a continuous and permanent nature, consisting of multiple human rights violations. 10 Cf. Case of Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 22, 2006. Series C No. 153, para. 84. Case of Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala. Monitoring Compliance with Judgment. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of January 27, 2009, Considering clause No. 12. 11 Cf. Case of Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala. Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, supra note 10, Considering clause No. 27. 12 Cf. Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 12, 2008, Series C No. 186, para. 182. 13 Cf. Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, paras. 149 and 150; Case of Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series C No. 5, paras. 157 and 158; and Case of Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v. Honduras. Merits, Judgment of March 15, 1989. Series C No. 6, para. 147.