components.11 However, the main conflict arose as a result of the constant tension between large indigenous ejido sectors and sectors aligned with the central government and the PRI party structure.12 21. Starting in 1994, the context of rural violence surged in northern Chiapas state, as a result of several political and economic changes, which destabilized the relationships of power prevailing in the region for many years.13 In response to the PRI’s political monopoly, in January 1994, the EZLN carried out an armed uprising for 12 days in order to protest the repression it endured at the hands of law enforcement agents and to demand greater autonomy, economic viability and respect for indigenous communities from the federal government.14 In the elections of August 1994, the PRD opposition defeated the PRI in many municipalities of the state, especially in rural ones.15 By that time, the conflict had polarized the ideological and political positions of civil society.16 Facing the threat to its control over the municipal governments of Chiapas in municipal elections that were to take place the following year, violent actions against PRD members and sympathizers were undertaken by armed groups linked to the State.17 22. In its 1998 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico, the Commission attested to a growing presence of the armed forces over the past years in predominantly indigenous areas of Chiapas and noticed that it was directly connected to the counterinsurgent struggle.18 Subsequently, the Commission ascertained that mainly after 1995 there was a “militarization of the northern region and the emergence there of paramilitary groups which have been accused of committing human rights violations.” 19 Thus, paramilitary activity – with the protection of the Mexican Army –targeted both the PRD political opposition, and indigenous rights movements, which were usually linked to the EZLN.20 23. As was previously established by the IACHR,21 the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) drafted the “1994 Chiapas Campaign Plan” (hereinafter “Chiapas Plan”) for the purpose of “destroying and/or disorganizing the political military structure of the EZLN.” 22 That document set the foundations for paramilitary activity in Chiapas, since it directly ordered utilizing the civilian population to assist in activities of the Mexican Army. In this way, the Military Intelligence Services were supposed to “secretly organize certain sectors of the civilian population; including cattlemen, small and individual business owners who were IACHR. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico. 1998, par. 552; UN. Economic and Social Council. Civil and political rights, in particular the issues of disappearances and summary executions. Report of Rapporteur, Mrs. Asma Jahangir, on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/35. E/CN.4/2000/3/Add.3 (“UN. Asma Jahangir Report”), November 25, 1999, par. 20; HRW. Implausible Deniability. State Responsibility for Rural Violence in Mexico. April 1997 (“HRW. Implausible Deniability”), pg. 35. 12 IACHR. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico. 1998, par. 552. 13 UN. Economic and Social Council. Human rights and indigenous matters. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties of Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen. E/CN.2/2004/80/Add.2 (“UN. Rodolfo Stavenhagen Report”), December 23, 2003, par. 38; UN. Asma Jahangir Report, par. 20; UN. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Mexico. Diagnostic Assessment of the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico. 2003 (“UN. Diagnostic Assessment of the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico”), pg. 156; HRW. Implausible Deniability, pg. 32. 14 IACHR. Merits Gilberto Jiménez Hernández et al, par. 50; UN. Asma Jahangir Report, par. 19. See also: HRW. Implausible Deniability, pg. 3; Annex 04. Centro de Derechos Humanos “Fray Bartolomé de las Casas”. Los Grupos Paramilitares en Chiapas [‘Paramilitary Groups in Chiapas’]. Mexico, January 10, 1999, pg. 3. Annex 1. Petitioner’s submission, January 15, 2008. 15 Federal Electoral Institute. 1994 federal election statistics: compendium of results. Mexico D.F., 1995, pgs. 175-184; HRW. Implausible Deniability, pg. 34; 16 UN. Rodolfo Stavenhagen Report, par. 38; UN. Diagnostic Assessment of Situation of Human Rights in Mexico, pg. 155. 17 HRW. Implausible Deniability, pgs. 34 and 35. 18 IACHR. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico. 1998, par. 526. See also: IACHR. Gilberto Jiménez Hernández et al Merits, par. 51. 19 IACHR. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico. 1998, par. 544. 20 IACHR. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico. 1998, par. 555; UN. Asma Jahangir Report, par. 35. 21 IACHR: IACHR. Gilberto Jiménez Hernández et al Merits, par. 52. 22 Annex 05. SEDENA. Plan Campaña Chiapas 1994. Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas. VII Región Militar, October 1994 (“SEDENA. 1994 Chiapas Campaign Plan”), item I.A.c. Annex 6. Petitioner’s submission, January 15, 2008. See also: Revista Proceso. Los documentos sobre el Plan de Campaña Chiapas 94 deben estar en los archivos de la Sedena y de la VII Región Militar [‘Documents on ’94 Chiapas Campaign Plan must be in the files of SEDENA and of VII Military Region’: General Garfias. Mexico, January 10, 1998. Available at: https://www.proceso.com.mx/177235/los-documentos-sobre-el-plan-de-campana-chiapas-94-deben-estar-en-los-archivos-de-lasedena-y-de-la-vii-region-militar-el-general-garfias; Marín, Carlos. Censuring the media, controlling organization of the masses, secretly coopting civilian sectors... Army’s Plan in Chiapas, since 1994: create paramilitary gangs, displace the population, destroy EZLN grassroots support... In: Revista Proceso, No. 1105, January 4, 1998. Available at: http://www.cuestiones.ws/revista/n10/ago02-mex-cm.htm. 11 5