characterized by a keen sense of patriotism, who would be employed in support of our operations.” 23 Subsequently, the Army would take charge of the “training and support of the self-defense forces and other paramilitary organizations” and “when no self-defense forces existed, it was necessary to create them.” 24 SEDENA’s principal objective in the “zone of expansion,” located in northern Chiapas, was “the destruction or neutralization of the local guerrillas, militiamen and commandos [by means of the] elimination of urban commandos and the breakdown of or control over organizations of the masses.”25 In said plan, the EZLN was regarded explicitly as “enemy forces”26 and it was also noted therein that “the possibility that the EZLN would be supported in the political structures of the Democratic Revolutionary Party should not be ruled out,”27 and consequently everyone who would be perceived as members or sympathizers of the EZLN or the PRD also was at risk.28 24. The Commission has also seen telegrams sent in May 1999 by the Office of the United States Military Attaché in Mexico to the United States Defense Intelligence Agency. These documents reveal the presence of paramilitary groups in the indigenous communities of the state of Chiapas and the Army’s “supervision” of them. In one of the documents, it is noted: “in mid 1994, the Mexican Army received presidential approval to install military teams in charge of promoting armed groups in the conflict areas in Chiapas. The idea was to assist local indigenous personnel in the resistance to the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN). Additionally, during the massacres of December 1997, military intelligence officers were involved in supervising armed groups in the mountains of Los Altos, in Chiapas.” These documents also describe the existence of “intelligence” operations in the indigenous areas to identify EZLN sympathizers.29 25. According to the accounts of different authors,30 paramilitary practice in Chiapas was founded on the Mexican military doctrine in force at the time, which sought to control the civilian population for it to be used in “counter guerrilla” operations. Evidence of the direct relationship between the military and paramilitary forces is the Manual de Guerra Irregular, [‘Unconventional War Manual’], which was published by SEDENA and consisted of the American “National Security Doctrine” tailored to the Mexican reality. The issuing of this document is attributed to General Mario Renán Castillo Fernández,31 who would take on the command of the VII Military Region and would lead the paramilitary surge in Chiapas. Said manual asserts that the State, during its military operations, should also make use of “militarized civilian personnel” as part of the struggle against “the enemy and traitors to the nation.” The role of the Army in the use of the civilian population in military activities is described as follows: “the commander of a theater of operations should employ all organized troops and even the civilian population to locate, harass and destroy opposing forces.” Annex 05. SEDENA. Plan Campaña Chiapas 1994, item I.A.r. Annex 6. Petitioner’s submission, January 15, 2008. Annex 05. SEDENA. Plan Campaña Chiapas 1994, item III.C.a.1.iii.(H). Annex 6. Petitioner’s submission, January 15, 2008. 25 Annex 05. SEDENA. Plan Campaña Chiapas 1994, item I.A.l. Annex 6. Petitioner’s submission, January 15, 2008. 26 Annex 05. SEDENA. Plan Campaña Chiapas 1994, item I.B. Annex 6. Petitioner’s submission, January 15, 2008. 27 Annex 05. SEDENA. Plan Campaña Chiapas 1994, items I.B.3. and I.E.a. Annex 6. Petitioner’s submission, January 15, 2008. 28 IACHR. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico. 1998, par. 557; HRW. Implausible Deniability, pgs. 14, 15, 35, 43, 44 and 89; Sandoval Palacios, Juan Manuel. Political military strategies of the Mexican State and of the EZLN: National security versus national sovereignty, in Kanoussi, Dora, El zapatismo y la política [Zapatism and politics]. Plaza and Valdés Publishers and Gramsci International Society, 1998, pg. 21; Galindo de Pablo, Adrián. El paramilitarismo en Chiapas. Respuesta del poder contra la sociedad organizada [‘Paramilitarism in Chiapas. Response of power against organized society’], in Política y Cultura, autumn 2015, no. 44, pgs. 194 and 197; López y Rivas, Gilberto; Sierra Guzmán, Jorge Luis; Enríquez del Valle, Alberto. Las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas a fin del milenio. Los militares en la coyuntura actual [The Mexican Armed Forces at the end of the millennium. The military in the current climate’]. PRD Parliamentary Group, Chamber of Deputies / LVII Legislature. Mexico, May 1999, pg. 33; UN. Economic and Social Council. Issue of the human rights of all persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment, and in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/38. E/CN.4/1998/38/Add.2. January 14, 1998 (“UN. Nigel S. Rodley Report”), pg. 28. 29 Annex 06. United States of American Department of State. Telegrams of May 1999 between the Office of the United States Defense Attaché in Mexico and the United States Defense Intelligence Agency (Washington D.C.). May 1999. Annex. Petitioner’s submission, June 14, 2010. 30 Sandoval Palacios, Juan Manuel. Political military strategies of the Mexican State and of the EZLN: National security versus national sovereignty, in Kanoussi, Dora, El zapatismo y la política [Zapatism and politics]. Plaza and Valdés Publishers and Gramsci International Society, 1998, pg. 109; Galindo de Pablo, Adrián. El paramilitarismo en Chiapas. Respuesta del poder contra la sociedad organizada, [‘Paramilitarism in Chiapas. Response of power against organized society’], in Política y Cultura, autumn 2015, no. 44, pgs. 189-213. 31 López y Rivas, Gilberto; Sierra Guzmán, Jorge Luis; Enríquez del Valle, Alberto. Las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas a fin del milenio. Los militares en la coyuntura actual. [‘The Mexican Armed Forces at the end of the millennium. The military in the current climate’]. PRD Parliamentary Group, Chamber of Deputies / LVII Legislature. Mexico, May 1999, pg. 39; Sierra Guzmá n, Jorge Luis. El Enemigo Interno: Contrainsurgencia y Fuerzas Armadas en México [‘The internal enemy: counterinsurgency and Armed Forces in Mexico’]. Mexico: Centro de Estudios Estraté gicos de Amé rica del Norte, 2003, pg. 171. 23 24 6

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