undertook to respect and ensure the rights recognized in the American Convention. Insofar as the State is concerned, the Commission points out that Ecuador has been a State Party to the American Convention since December 28, 1977, when it deposited its respective instrument of ratification. Therefore, the Commission has ratione personae competence to examine the petition. 48. The Commission has ratione loci competence to hear the petition as it alleges violations of rights protected by the American Convention that occurred in the territory of a State Party to that treaty. The IACHR has ratione temporis competence because the obligation to respect and ensure the rights protected by the American Convention already were in effect for the State on the date on which the alleged violations occurred. Finally, the Commission has ratione materiae competence because the petition claims violations of human rights protected by the American Convention. 49. The Commission lacks competence with respect to the petitioner’s claim that the Ecuadorian State should be found to have failed to comply with ILO Convention 169. Nonetheless, it can and must use Convention 169 as a guideline for interpreting conventional obligations, in light of the provisions of Article 29 of the American Convention. B. Requirements for Admissibility 1. Exhaustion of domestic remedies and timeliness of the petition 50. The State argues that the petition has failed to satisfy the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention because the constitutional amparo suit filed by the petitioners was neither adequate nor effective for resolving the alleged infringement of a legal right and therefore it challenges the exception to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 51. In this regard, it adds that the Inter-American Court has held that it is incumbent upon the State to indicate which domestic remedies must be exhausted and identifies as appropriate and effective remedies the subjective or full jurisdiction remedy and the remedy of appeal (cassation), both in the administrative disputes jurisdiction. 52. The State informs the Commission that Ecuadorian law in the administrative disputes jurisdiction provides, in Article 1, that the administrative dispute remedy may be lodged by natural or juridical persons against regulations, acts, and resolutions by public administration or semi-public juridical persons acting on behalf of the State and who violate a right or direct interest of the complainant.13 This remedy may fall either in the subjective or full jurisdiction or in the annulment or objective category. The subjective or full jurisdiction remedy protects the subjective right of the complainant that has allegedly been denied, disregarded, or totally or partially unrecognized by the administrative act in question.14 53. The remedy described by the State is intended to challenge regulations, acts and resolutions by public administration or semi-public juridical persons. The Statute of the Administrative Law System of the Executive15 defines an administrative act as any unilateral declaration made in the exercise of the administrative function that has direct individual legal effects16 and an administrative contract such as any multilateral or intentional act or declaration that produces legal effects, between two or more people, one of whom is acting in an administrative capacity. 13 Article 1 of the Administrative Disputes Jurisdiction Statute. 14 Article 3 of the Administrative Disputes Jurisdiction Statute. 15 Statute of the Administrative Legal System of the Executive, Executive Decree 1634.RO/Sup 411 of March 31, 1994. 16 Article 64 of the Statute of the Administrative Legal System of the Executive. 10