43. Continuing with its observations and with respect to the petitioners’ claim that the State violated the American Convention by failing to comply with its international obligations acquired through the ratification of ILO Convention 169, the Ecuadorian State asserts that it had not yet ratified Convention 169 at the time that it signed the oil concession contract with the CGC in 1996 and that, therefore, the Convention had not been incorporated into its domestic law. The State points out that international law doctrine concerning the international responsibility of States is based on the premise that every internationally illegal act committed by a State gives rise to that State’s responsibility. It adds that this same doctrine includes two key elements for determining State responsibility: first, the existence of conduct constituting an act or omission attributable to a State, and second, the existence of conduct that constitutes a violation of an international obligation of that State. The State argues that in the subjudice petition, the international obligation emanating from Convention 169 did not exist because Ecuador ratified that Convention in 1999, after having signed the contract with CGC. 44. Regarding the constitutional amparo suit brought by the petitioners, the State indicates that with regard to timeliness, international jurisprudence has not established a precise cuantum for the length of the process; rather it establishes certain, defined criteria to consider in concrete cases. In this aspect, the Ecuadorian State maintains that since the time frames in which the State has acted to resolve the domestic suit fall within the parameters of reasonableness established by the Inter-American Court and Commission, it cannot be said to have violated Article 8(1) of the American Convention. 45. The State likewise argues that, at the domestic level, the petitioner has had access to all remedies available under Ecuadorian law for the alleged violations and that the competent court ruled on the remedy lawfully and in keeping with legal due process. In addition, the State affirms that it has respected the judicial protections that make up what is referred to as due process, and that it has always ensured a fair and impartial process. 46. In light of the foregoing, the State does not believe it is necessary to examine the merits of the petition, since it cannot be accepted by the Commission, and requests that the petition be declared inadmissible and immediately closed. IV. ANALYSIS OF ADMISSIBILITY A. The Commission’s Competence ratione personae, ratione materiae, ratione temporis and ratione loci 47. The petitioners are entitled, in principle, under Article 44 of the American Convention, to lodge petitions before the IACHR. The petition names as the alleged victims the Kichwa indigenous people of the Sarayaku community and its members,12 on whose behalf the State 12 The Kichwa people of Sarayaku are an organized community, situated in a specific geographical area, whose members can be individually identified. In this regard, see paragraph 9 of the Resolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of July 6, 2004 on Provisional Measures requested by the Inter-American Commission with respect to Ecuador, Case of Sarayaku Indigenous Community, which states: “That the Court has ordered the protection of a plurality of people who have not been previously named but who are identifiable and specified, and who are in a situation of grave danger because of their membership in a community. In this case, according to what the Commission has indicated, the Kichwa indigenous people of Sarayaku, comprising approximately 1,200 people, constitutes an organized community situated in a specific geographical area in the population centers of Shiguacoca, Chontayaku, Sarayakillo, Cali Cali, Teresa Mama, Llanchama, and Sarayaku Centro, in the province of Pastaza, whose members can be individually identified and who, for reasons of belonging to that community, are all facing an equal risk of suffering acts of aggression against their personal integrity and their lives. Therefore, the Court believes it is necessary to dictate provisional measures of protection on behalf of the members of the Kichwa indigenous people of Sarayaku, and which extend to all members of that community. See also the Case of the Jiguamiandó and Curbaradó Communities. Provisional Measures. Resolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of March 6, 2003, ninth consideration; Case of the Paz Community of San José de Apartadó. Provisional Measures. Resolution of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights of June 18, 2002, eighth consideration; and the Case of the Paz Community of San José de Apartadó. Provisional Measures. Resolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 24, 2000, seventh consideration. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community. Judgment of August 31, 2001. Ser. C No. 79, para. 149. 9