30 same,96 its preamble and regulations, but also from Article 17(1) of the Declaration of the United Nations on the Protection of all Persons against Enforced Disappearances of 1992, that even adds another element, related to the duty of investigation when it mentions that the crime of reference shall be considered “permanent while its authors continue to hide the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared person and while the facts have not been clarified.” International jurisprudence also reflects this understanding97 and it refers in similar terms to Articles 4 and 8(1)(b) of the mentioned International Convention of the United Nations on the subject.98 86. On its part, Guatemalan criminal legislation acknowledges that the crime of forced disappearance of people “is considered permanent as long as the victim has not been released.” (supra para. 82) 87. Since this is a crime of permanent execution, that it, its consummation is prolonged in time, if at the time the definition of the crime of forced disappearance of persons when into force in the domestic criminal law, the author maintains his criminal behavior, the new law is applicable. The courts of a higher hierarchy within the American continent, such as the National Criminal Court of Peru, the Constitutional Court of Peru, the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico, the Constitutional Court of Bolivia, the Supreme Court of Justice of Panama, The Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela, and the Constitutional Court of Colombia,99 96 Cfr. Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 1987-1988, Chapter V.II. This crime “is permanent since it is not committed instantly but in a permanent and prolonged manner during the totality of the period during which the person remains disappeared.” (OEA/CP-CAJP, Report of the President of the Workgroup In Charge of Analyzing the Project of the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearances of Persons, doc. OEA/Ser.G/CP/CAJP-925/93 rev.1, de 25.01.1994, p. 10). See in the same sense Case of Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, supra note 67, para. 83; and Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, supra note 17, para. 107. 97 Cfr. Kurt v. Turkey, App. No. 24276/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998); Cakici v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999); Ertak v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000); Timurtas v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000); Tas v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000); Cyprus v. Turkey, Application No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), paras. 136, 150, and 158; Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, case of Ivan Somers v. Hungary, Communication No. 566/1993, 57th session, CCPR/C/57/D/566/1993 (1996), July 23, 1996, par. 6.3; case of E. y A.K. v. Hungary, Communication No. 520/1992, 50º session, CCPR/C/50/D/520/1992 (1994), May 5, 1994, para. 6.4, and case of Solorzano v. Venezuela, Communication No. 156/1983, 27th session, CCPR/C/27/D/156/1983, 26 March 1986, para. 5.6. 98 Cfr. In what is relevant, Article 8(1)(b) of the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance establishes that: “[…] A State Party which applies a statute of limitations in respect of enforced disappearance shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the term of limitation for criminal proceedings; […] […] Commences from the moment when the offence of enforced disappearance ceases, taking into account its continuous nature. […]” 99 The National Criminal Chamber of Peru with regard to the investigation of the disappearance of Mr. Castillo Paéz, upon deciding if the facts attributed in the crime of forced disappearance of persons, established that “some of the defense attorneys of those accused have objected that it would be contrary to the rule of freedom from ex post facto law, to take into consideration a criminal figure not defined in the domestic legislation, such as the forced disappearance of persons, that was not in force at the time of the fact. In this sense we must state that up to this moment, we ignore the whereabouts of the youngster Castillo Páez, situation that directly results from the criminally defined actions of the author and for which he must respond in all its magnitude. If we base our decision of the seemingly undeniable circumstance that we have not yet established the whereabouts of the student Ernesto Castillo Páez, we must presume that his illegal deprivation of freedom continues, and that therefore this crime, and its characterization as