[…] 4. A request for interpretation shall not suspend the effect of the judgment. 5. The Court shall determine the procedure to be followed and shall render its decision in the form of a judgment. 8. In addition, Article 31(3) of the Rules of Procedure establishes that “[t]he judgments and orders of the Court may not be contested in any way.” 9. The Court observes that the representative presented his request for interpretation of judgment within the 90-day period established in Article 67 of the Convention, because it was notified on March 29, 2011. 10. As the Court has ruled previously in its consistent case law, clearly supported by the applicable law, a request for interpretation of judgment should not be used as a means of contesting the decision whose interpretation is required. The purpose of this request is exclusively to determine the meaning of a ruling when one of the parties affirms that the text of its operative paragraphs or its considerations lacks clarity or precision, provided that those considerations affect the said operative paragraph.3 Consequently, it is not possible to request the modification or annulment of the respective judgment by means of a request for interpretation.4 11. The Court will proceed to analyze the request for interpretation submitted by the representative and, if appropriate, make the clarifications that it deems pertinent. To this end, it will examine the questions raised by the representative and the arguments of the State. As already mentioned (supra para. 4), the Commission indicated that it had no observations to make on the request for interpretation of the judgment. IV INADMISSIBILITY OF THE REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION Arguments of the parties 12. The representative indicated that the victims “have the right to express [...] their disagreement concerning the amount [established in the judgment] for pecuniary damage.” In particular, the representative argued that the Court “inverts the juridical principle of the burden of proof so that it is for the victims to contradict the State’s initial argument which asserted that the 1993 salary restructuring absorbs the increases arising from the salary scale system,” “when it is public knowledge that, owing to the strictly confidential nature of the 1993 salary restructuring,” “the victims were not in a position to be aware of or possess the documentation related to the said salary restructuring.” He insisted that the 1993 3 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Interpretation of the Judgment on merits. Order of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights of March 8, 1998. Series C No. 47, para. 16; Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico. Interpretation of the judgment on preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 15, 2011. Series C No. 226, para. 11, and Case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador. Interpretation of the judgment on reparations and costs. Judgment of August 29, 2011 Series C No. 230, para. 11. 4 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Interpretation of the judgment on merits, supra note 1, para. 16; Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico. Interpretation of the judgment on preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, supra note 1, para. 11, and Case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador. Interpretation of the judgment on reparations and costs, supra note 1, para. 11. 3