33 or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.41 109. In cases where the Court decided that it had no ratione temporis jurisdiction to decide upon certain facts, it has made it clear that this situation does not imply a judgment about the existence of those facts.42 110. In cases where the applicant alleged the violation of Articles 5(3) or 6(1) of the European Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, the European Court of Human Rights has restricted its considerations to the time period that falls into its ratione temporis jurisdiction, starting from the date on which the State recognized the right of individual petition or ratified the Convention. It is significant, however, that the European Court nevertheless takes into account the amount of time that has elapsed before this effective date – in cases of detention or in a legal proceeding, for example – in its assessment of rights violations.43 111. The Court notes that the criminal proceedings lasted for more than 12 years, if calculated from the first arrest of Mr. Caesar on November 11, 1983, as the Commission and the representatives have done. However, as Trinidad and Tobago’s recognition of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction took effect on May 28, 1991, the Court can only consider the period between the date of that recognition and the decision of the Court of Appeal on February 28, 1996, the final judgment delivered in the criminal proceedings. Mr. Caesar was convicted on January 10, 1992 by the High Court of Trinidad and Tobago. His lawyers waited for almost two years to request leave to appeal and, on February 28, 1996, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and confirmed the sentence. Therefore, the Court finds that the duration of the criminal proceedings between May 28, 1991, and February 28, 1996 – discounting the period of almost two years before that leave to appeal was sought – does not constitute a delay that can be considered unreasonable, in the terms of Article 8(1) of the Convention. 112. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court considers that the State is not responsible for a violation of Article 8(1) of the Convention. * 113. The Court must now turn to examine whether the domestic law of the State provides an effective remedy against either the existence or the application of corporal punishment. 114. In the instant case, domestic judges were authorized to sentence Mr. Caesar to flogging with the “cat-o-nine-tails” under the laws of Trinidad and Tobago – specifically, the Corporal Punishment Act. 41 Cf. Case of the Serrano-Cruz Sisters. Preliminary Objections, supra note 4, paras. 60, 61 and 64; Case of Alfonso Martín-del Campo-Dodd. Preliminary Objections, supra note 4, para. 68; and Cantos Case. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of September 7, 2001, Series C No. 85, para. 35. 42 Cf. Case of Alfonso Martín-del Campo-Dodd. Preliminary Objections, supra note 4, paras. 79 to 84. 43 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Kudla v. Poland, Grand Chamber, (30210/96), Judgment of October 26, 2000, paras. 102-103 and 119-123; Eur. Court H.R., Humen v. Poland, Grand Chamber, (26614/95), Judgment of October 15, 1999, paras. 58-59. See also, Eur. Court H.R., Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, (48787/99), Judgment of July 8, 2004, paras. 395-400.