6 imposing harsh punishment, deliberately and at the hands of an officer of the State, for the purpose of inflicting corporal punishment. All of which falls perfectly into the international definition of torture. Certainly, when referring to the Inter-American Convention I do not intend to render it applicable to the State, which has not ratified the Convention. I refer to the Convention as a useful instrument to interpret the references contained in Article 5 of the American Convention. The Court has mentioned treaties, the direct application of which is outside its purview, for the purpose of gaining proper understanding of the rules it must apply, such as those contained in Articles 5(1) and (2) of the Convention. 20. In other cases, the Inter-American Court has expressed its view on the existence of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In doing so, it has taken into account, among other factors —therefore, not exclusively— the extent of the suffering inflicted upon the victim as a result of the attack on the person’s integrity. In this regard, the Court’s opinion is that there is torture when the kind of suffering inflicted is particularly severe, more so than the lesser —though certainly reprehensible always— one in other instances of mistreatment included in Article 5(2) of the American Convention. It is evident that the suffering caused to the victim by means of flagellation with the “cat o’ nine tails” corresponds to the kind that may be classified as torture. 21. It is obvious that this classification of the punishment ordered and inflicted in the instant case cannot be dismissed on the grounds that said punishment is provided for in domestic law, as it has been in other provisions before, fortunately repealed long ago by the vast majority of States. The formal “legality” of an action does not necessary modify its intrinsic “injustice” or “illegitimacy”, which is a frequently relevant issue when considering the compatibility of provisions or actions by domestic authorities with the principles and rules of the international law on human rights, which is the natural function of the courts within this purview. In this regard, I found the statements made by Mr. Nigel S. Rodley enlightening: “it is not possible to accept the notion that the administration of such punishments as stoning to death, flogging and amputation (… ) can be deemed lawful simply because the punishment has been authorized in a procedurally legitimate manner (…).” 22. Therefore, the sufferings in the instant case are not naturally derived from the imposition of a lawful sanction —that is to say, a sanction that does not, in itself, undermine human dignity, which is the justification referred to in the last sentence of Article 1(1) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984. I have asserted and hereby emphasize that flogging is in itself contrary to human dignity. 23. We are not faced with an inevitable and inflexible, absolutely necessary sanction, the omission or replacement of which may jeopardize collective security or public peace, in such a manner that the preservation the legal order and the preponderance of justice may not be secured through less cruel means. This type of sanction is intended solely and exclusively to cause suffering, unable —and not even willing— to attain a plausible moral objective. It humiliates the person being punished and degrades the person administering the punishment. In raising his hand against a fellow man, brandishing an element devised to harm the body and overpower the spirit of the offender, even if ordered by the State, the person administering the punishment retrogrades several centuries in the history of our species. Flagellation is, ultimately, pure violence, which as such falls on the punished