9 Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago now adds to this list. The violation of rights resulting from the intolerable conditions prevailing in many prisons already constitutes one of the major issues brought before the Inter-American jurisdiction. V. PROPORTIONALITY OF PUNISHMENT 34. In the instant case, consideration could have been given to the reasonableness —which, in the instant case, implies lawfulness— of the punishment consisting of the deprivation of liberty prescribed by law and imposed by the judge. Within the framework of criminal law in a democratic society, which entails careful classification of unlawful conduct and the reasonable assessment of its consequences, an adequate gradation of punitive reactions according to the legal interests attained and to the damage or the risk caused. The greater the legal interest protected through the classification of offenses and the damage or risk caused, the harsher the punishment imposable. It is not admissible to punish attempt, which is the offense referred to in the records submitted in the instant case by the competent authorities, with the heavy sanctions that should be imposed on a perfected criminal act. If this principle is set aside, as is the case here, the principle of proportionality of punishment will be attained. 35. The problem of the sanction becomes more apparent in the light of its legal quantitative imprecision, with the potential excesses that may result from it, which became a reality in the case brought before the domestic jurisdiction, which provides no ground whatsoever to opt for a specific term of imprisonment. As a result of this lack of sufficient grounds, the punishment imposed becomes discretionary. Section 31(1) of the Offences against the Person Act, which contains the type of offense (purportedly) considered in the instant case, sets forth that: “Any person who is convicted of the offense of rape is liable to imprisonment for life or for any term of years.” It follows that, any rape, regardless of the surrounding circumstances, and even the degree of perpetration reached in the iter criminis —which, in the instance case, amounted to attempt— is subject to a sanction that may range from one year to life imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court. 36. Thus, the law provides for a single punishment for two distinctively different situations: actual rape and attempted rape. The law contains no rule whatsoever to determine the sanction that may result from, in a specific case, this identity in terms of punishment. All of this follows not only from reading the statutes but also from the explicit assessment made by the judge and the attorneys —for the defense and for the prosecution— regarding the meaning and the scope of the relevant law, assessment which is included in the records of the case. Such gross lack of determination could hardly be deemed natural when considering the legality principle in criminal law and the rights of the accused. 37. Once again we are faced with a situation of lack of reference as was the case with the Mandatory Death Penalty, on which the Court found in the Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamín et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, judgment of June 21, 2002, to which I appended a Separate Opinion, certain considerations of which are applicable to the case at hand insofar as they refer to general principles of criminal law, ignored by the legislation applied then as well as now. It is obvious that the reasonableness of punishment entails, in itself, no conflict whatsoever between the rights of the accused, on the one hand, and public safety and protection to the victim, on the other.