34 108. The Court underscores that it is the national authorities who are responsible for assessing the pertinence of maintaining the preventive measures they order under their own laws. However, it is for the Court to assess whether the actions of these authorities are in conformity with the precepts of the American Convention. To this end, it must examine whether the judicial proceedings guaranteed not only the formal possibility of submitting arguments, but also the form in which, substantively, the right to defense was manifested as a real safeguard of the rights of the accused, which involve a reasoned and prompt response by the authorities to the pleas. 150 In this regard, the decisions adopted by domestic bodies that could affect human rights must be duly justified; otherwise, they are arbitrary.151 The Court underscores that, when a person is detained, judges must not wait until delivering an acquittal for him to recover his liberty, but must periodically assess whether the reasons and purposes that justified the deprivation of liberty remain, whether the preventive measure is still absolutely necessary to achieve these purposes, and whether it is proportionate.152 109. In the instant case, the Court finds it unnecessary to examine whether Mr. Neptune was informed of the reasons for his detention based on domestic laws, given that the criminal proceedings were invalid and the detention itself has been classified as unlawful and arbitrary. Even if the ordinary criminal courts had been competent, the Court considers that, since the charges against Mr. Neptune were drawn up in the closing order 14 months after his arrest, the State incurred in a clear violation of its obligation to notify the charges “promptly” contained in Article 7(4) of the Convention. The relevant point is that, if a person does not receive adequate information on the reasons for his detention, he does not know what charges he must defend himself against, and consequently, judicial control becomes meaningless. 110. Moreover, it has been established that Mr. Neptune was released two years and one month after his arrest on “humanitarian grounds” and not based on a judicial decision that assessed whether the reasons and purposes that justified depriving him of his liberty subsisted, whether the preventive measure continued to be absolutely necessary to achieve these purposes, and whether it was proportionate. In other words, there is no evidence that the decision to release him was a motivated and prompt response of the authorities that sought to provide a real safeguard for the rights of the accused; in particular, a substantive guarantee of his right to defense. Hence, the charges against Mr. Neptune remained in force, so that he continued to be susceptible of being detained, which could result in arbitrariness. 111. Based on the above, the Court finds that the State violated Mr. Neptune’s right to be taken before a judge “promptly” and to be tried within a reasonable time or released, embodied in Article 7(4) and 7(5) of the American Convention. 150 Cf. Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra note 36, para. 107. 151 Cf. Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra note 36, para. 107; Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Series C No. 151, para. 120, and Yatama v. Nicaragua. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127, para. 152. The European Court has indicated that judges must indicate the grounds on which they take their decisions with sufficient clarity. Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, Judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A No 252, paras. 22 and 23. 152 Cf. Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra note 36, para.117.