5 and in the structuring of its judgments, which at times may appear overabundant or redundant. In the event of acceptance and acquiescence by the State –acceptance of the facts and acquiescence to the claims— it might be possible to do without the presentation of evidence of the facts, which have already been accepted, and accounts of such facts in a judgment in which the court is no longer required to verify the facts that constitute the violations, but merely to define their consequences (if the parties have not reached a settlement regarding such consequences or if such consequences cannot be the subject-matter of a settlement agreement by the parties). 20. However, court decisions on human rights seek to “set an example” and “be instructive.” They contribute to the “uncovering of the truth” and “political and social rectification.” Put differently, they are not limited to or satisfied by a brief decision on the specific dispute –which, by the way, has already come to an end–, but seek to instruct on the factors that breach fundamental rights, breaching practices, the suffering of victims, the requirements of a reparation that extends beyond compensation or monetary redress, the general knowledge of the violations committed. In this sense, it has a more pronounced social, historical, moral, and pedagogic nature than other expressions of public justice. 21. To sum up, this is a sui generis form of justice that takes on the political and moral values of a given society and goes over the relations between political power and human beings. This is the reason why the hearings held by the Inter-American Court and the judgments rendered by it address issues that are formally not the subject-matter of the dispute but which nevertheless affect society as a whole and have to do with the duties created by the system of human rights protection, of which the Inter-American jurisdiction is a part. Fortunately, these particularities of human rights justice have been properly understood by the parties to the proceedings, and this allows cases to proceed subject to their distinctive features, which might be unnecessary or even inadmissible in other jurisdictions. ASSESSMENT OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE FACTS 22. The existence of very serious violations, in a context that is specifically injurious to the human rights of a large group of people, or of vulnerable individuals that would require special guarantees by the State, supports the Court’s ruling on reparations. It is here that the Court’s assessment of the significance and egregious nature of the violations and the nature and amount, if appropriate, of the reparations is expressed. Sometimes reference is made to the “aggravated liability” of the State when dealing with a series of violations that are particularly reprehensible. Strictly speaking, actually, there is no “aggravated liability” but facts that engage the State’s international responsibility and the seriousness of which warrants more serious consequences. 23. I have previously stated that liability –the capacity or duty to be answerable for certain facts, conduct, duties or guarantees— is a relationship between the holder of a right and the facts and conduct, viewed in the light of a given legal classification and specified legal consequences. Therefore, this is a formal concept that creates a link between the responsible party, the conduct for which such liability applies and the consequences flowing from the whole matter. Accordingly, liability in and of itself is neither aggravated nor mitigated. The serious or minor nature pertains to the facts and, therefore, influences the greater or lesser harshness of the reaction allowed by