10 a) On February 25 and 26, 1986, Mrs. Virginia Ugarte Rivera filed petitions with Lima’s Forty-sixth Examining Court seeking writs of habeas corpus on behalf of Mr. Nolberto Durand Ugarte and Mr. Gabriel Pablo Ugarte Rivera, who were detained by police from DIRCOTE on February 14 and 15, respectively, on suspicion of terrorism. According to the Commission, proceedings on the two writs were suspended when riots broke out at a number of Peruvian prisons on June 18, 1986; and b) On June 26, 1986, subsequent to the riots on June 18 of that year, Mrs. Virginia Ugarte Rivera filed for another writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Mr. Durand Ugarte and Mr. Ugarte Rivera, this time with Callao’s First Examining Court. On June 27, 1986, that Court denied the writ. On July 15, 1986, Callao’s First Police Court upheld the other court’s ruling. On August 13, 1986, the Supreme Court’s First Criminal Law Chamber found that the July 15, 1986 ruling was not null and void. On October 28, 1986, the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees ruled that “the decision in question stands; claimant still has the right to bring another action” (supra, para. 2.d). 37. The Court notes that the first petitions filed concerned the imprisonment of Mr. Durand Ugarte and Mr. Ugarte Rivera following their arrest by DIRCOTE police; the second concerned their disappearance in the wake of the events of June 18, 1986. Given the foregoing, the Court considers that the remedy of habeas corpus filed on June 26, 1986, is the remedy to be considered to determine whether local remedies were exhausted; after being heard at several instances, that petition was denied by the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees (supra, para. 2.d). It has thus been established that in the instant case, the appropriate domestic remedy was pursued and exhausted. 38. Moreover, the Court observes that while the Commission requested information from the State concerning the exhaustion of local remedies on May 19, 1987, it was not until September 29, 1989 that the State informed the Commission that the case was being heard in the military courts. With the Commission, therefore, the State did not argue exhaustion of local remedies as a preliminary objection and hence cannot do so now (stopple) to win its argument with this Court. 39. The Court, therefore, dismisses the first preliminary objection. VIII MATTER DECIDED, RES JUDICATA, THE COURT’S LACK OF JURISDICTION Objection Two 40. The second objection argued by the State concerns the “matter decided by the Commission.” 41. The State argued that although the Commission acknowledged that the facts in the instant case were precisely the same as those in the Neira Alegría et al. Case, the Commission did not opt to join the two petitions, which was the procedure provided in Article 40.2 of its Regulations. It further noted that the defendant State in both cases was the same.