SEPARATE OPINION OF JUEZ EDUARDO FERRER MAC-GREGOR POISOT CASE OF VELÁSQUEZ PAIZ ET AL. V. GUATEMALA JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 19, 2015 (Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs) INTRODUCTION: “OBLIGATION OF PREVENTION” IN GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 1. The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (“Convention of Belém do Pará”) is the regional instrument that has elicited the greatest consensus among the countries of the Americas, and has been signed, and ratified or adhered to by 32 of the 35 OAS Member States. Since its entry into force in 1995, it has reflected the concern of the States parties that “violence against women is an offense against human dignity and a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between women and men”; while affirming that “violence against women constitutes a violation of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, and impairs or nullifies the observance, enjoyment and exercise of such rights and freedoms.”1 2. More than 20 years after it entered into force, it is a cause for concern that the culture of discrimination and violence against women,2 continues to be present in the region, achieving its maximum expression in “feminicide” or “femicide”; that is, the “gender-based murder of women,” as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the InterAmerican Court” or “the Court”) first underlined in the case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico in 2009,3 and reiterated in the case of Veliz Franco et al., and in the present case of Velázquez Paiz et al., both against Guatemala.4 The term “feminicidio” was incorporated into the latest edition of the Diccionario de la Lengua Española, published by the Real Academia Española in October 2014,5 almost 10 years after the lamentable facts of the case that gives rise to this separate opinion. Preamble of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (“Convention of Belém do Pará”), adopted on June 9 1994, during the twenty-fourth General Assembly of the OAS, entered into force on May 5, 1995. 2 Understood as “any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere.” Article 1 of the “Convention of Belém do Pará.” 3 I/A Court HR, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 143. 4 In the judgments in both cases, the terms “feminicide” and “femicide” were used interchangeably to refer to the “gender-based murder of women.” Also, the two judgments underlined that, in May 2008, Guatemala had enacted the Law against Femicide and other forms of violence against women (Decree No. 22-2008), which criminalized “femicide,” defining this as the “violent death of a woman, occurring in the context of the unequal power relations between women and men, in exercise of gender-based power against women.” See Case of Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 19, 2014. Series C No. 277, para. 71, footnote 68; and Case of Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections, Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 19, 2015, Series C No. 307, para. 45, footnote 26. 5 “Femicide”: from the lat. femĭna 'woman' and -cidio. 1.m. Asesinato de una mujer por razón de su sexo. Available at: http://dle.rae.es/ 1