35 119. Meanwhile, in the Dominican Republic, on February 24, 1999, the Supreme Court of Justice recognized that the protection provided for in Article 25(1) of the American Convention comprised part of the positive domestic law by virtue of the provisions of Articles 3 and 10 of the Constitution, thus establishing the writ of amparo in the country.172 The foregoing was in response to an appeal filed against a judgment from the Court of Labor of the National District. Similarly, the Supreme Court established the general guidelines of competency, procedure, and deadlines of the writ of amparo.173 The writ of amparo is currently found established in the new Constitution of 2010, and the recently installed Constitutional Court hears appeals filed in connection to judgments rendered in this matter.174 120. With the foregoing examples, I do not intend to demonstrate that the High Court of Justice of Suriname should have necessarily followed the same steps of these Latin American tribunals, but rather that, in any case, the American Convention should have been given practical effect, specifically in regard to the arguments of the violation of Article 8(2)(h), which was flagrantly violated. In this regard, it is important to note that, on occasion, the Inter-American Court has ordered that control for conformity with the Convention be exercised to remedy these situations. Surely, the law should have facilitated the operation of the High Court of Justice or, if applicable, created the Constitutional Court and given it jurisdiction to resolve matters of this sort. Therefore, the turning to an instance to claim the unconstitutionality and non-conformity with the Convention of the absence of a specific recourse should have translated into some response on the part of the judiciary, in this case, perhaps by the High Court of Justice. However, the same omissions in the full implementation of the model of constitutional control compromised the ability of the High Court to do more and, without doubt, left Mr. Alibux in a situation of defenselessness, thereby violating his right to judicial protection embodied in Article 25 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) and 2 of such international instrument, in such a way that, in the case at hand, the Inter-American System had to act in the alternative. 121. Second, viewing the right to judicial protection as a means of integrating the rights would have shed a different light on the claims of Mr. Alibux in a model of exercising control for conformity with the Convention. 122. As it has already been mentioned, Article 25(1) (judicial protection) of the American Convention provides that “Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse […] for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention […].” 123. In this case, Mr. Alibux argued before the High Court of Justice of his country that Article 140 of the Constitution and the Indictment of Political Office Holders Act were inconsistent with Article 14(5) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention for creating a process in a sole instance before such High Court of Justice;175 that is, he presented in a precise manner an argument of non172 Cf. Supreme court of Justice of Dominican Republic, Case of Productos Avon, S.A. February 24, 1999. 173 As such, Law No. 437-06 was enacted which establishes the Remedy of Amparo (no longer in effect). 174 It is established as such in the Dominican Constitution of 2010 (Article 185) and in the Organic Law of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Constitutional Procedures, num. 137-11 (Article 94). 175 Cf. Para. 117 of the Judgment.