6 17. Third, Mexico stated that the corresponding criminal responsibility has not yet been legally determined, because criminal proceedings were still ongoing. These are the domestic criminal proceedings “that [will] permit identifying [those responsible] and thus establish whether they are agents of the State and the institution to which they belong.” It reiterated that “independent of whether or not those responsible belong to a specific institution, the investigations will be carried out under the ordinary system of justice, as the Court ordered.” 18. Fourth, the State argued that “the ruling made [by the Court] in its judgment that it was military personnel who perpetrated the rape […] appears to run contrary to the American Convention itself […] and even to the guarantees established in the Constitution of the United Mexican States.” In this regard, in order to attribute direct responsibility to military personnel, the authorities must follow a procedure that permits duly attributing participation in the facts and, if appropriate, the guilt of the State agents. Proceeding in any other way could violate articles 14, 16 and 20 of the Constitution, as well as Articles 8, 24, and 25 of the Convention owing to failure to provide adequate judicial guarantees and protection, especially regarding the presumption of innocence. The State highlighted that “all the stages of the investigation in this case will be carried out exhaustively in order to elucidate the facts and thereby safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused,” and it indicated that “if the authorities do not respect these principles, which are also in keeping with the standards set by [the] Court, they would be violating the provisions of Mexican law and the guarantees established in the […] Convention.” 19. Fifth, Mexico reiterated the need for the Court to “clarify the meaning of paragraph 103 of the judgment in relation to paragraphs 115, 116 and 117.” In this regard, it pointed out that, having established in paragraph 103 that it was not incumbent on the Court to establish individual responsibility, the Court then “refers to the perpetration of rape against Mrs. […] Fernández Ortega.” According to the State, “the Court proceeded to evaluate the facts within its specific contentious jurisdiction in the area of human rights, as revealed in paragraph 117[.] This matter becomes important because, in paragraph 194, […] the Court itself emphasized […] the guiding principles that should be observed in criminal investigations into human rights violations. According to the provision that domestic legislation must be adapted to the Convention, it is important that the Court take into consideration that, once each of [those] principles has been complied with […] in the investigations into the rape allegedly committed by soldiers, […] it will not depend solely and exclusively on the Public Prosecution Service to determine whether or not a crime has been committed, […] but rather on the ruling that, if appropriate, is issued by the competent judicial authority.” Consequently, the judgment should not “be interpreted as an order or instruction that necessarily leads to the criminal prosecution of three soldiers [or] to imposing punishment on the three individuals referred to in the judgment because, in addition to the fact that the Court cannot individualize responsibilities, it did not order these measures.” The State therefore requested that “the scope of paragraph 103 of the judgment in relation to paragraphs 115, 116 and 117 be clarified, both because [the] Court did not establish individual criminal responsibilities (because it confined its ruling to its contentious jurisdiction) and because, in the eleventh operative paragraph, it ordered that the investigations be conducted and, as appropriate, criminal proceedings be filed against those found responsible so that the competent judicial authority could rule on the existence of criminal responsibilities and, if appropriate, impose the legal punishments and consequences.” The State concluded that the judgment “is unclear” and therefore requested clarification of whether “it should be understood in the