7 sense that the investigations and the criminal prosecution must have the specific sole and unequivocal result of punishing three soldiers.” 20. Finally, sixth, the State affirmed that it is “concerned […] that the Court’s decision entails a violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence established in Article 8(2) of the Convention, […] given that paragraph 103 in relation to paragraphs 115, 116, and 117 suggests that, based on the judgment, the domestic public prosecution and judicial authorities must necessarily seek out and punish three guilty parties.” 21. The Inter-American Commission recalled that, for an international court, the standards for appraising evidence are less formal than under domestic legal systems and that in its proceedings, the Inter-American Court can find indications of the participation of agents that entail the State’s responsibility. It considered that the State had the opportunity to litigate the issues raised in its request for interpretation at the appropriate procedural moment and that there was no basis for reopening the discussion on matters that the Court had already decided. It added that the State’s arguments contradict the basic principles of the international responsibility of States, and are “contrary to what the Court established in its judgment and represent a disregard for what the Court established as well as a threat to the binding nature of the rulings of the Inter-American Court and its authority.” Finally, the Commission noted that a fundamental aspect to be considered in this case in order to establish the international responsibility of the State was whether members of the army participated, without individualizing them or punishing their conduct. Based on the foregoing, the Commission reiterated that the State’s request was unnecessary and inadmissible and did not meet the legal requirements to be considered a request for interpretation. 22. The representatives affirmed that the State’s arguments reveal the State’s disagreement with the Court’s decision and its wish that it be modified, even though its meaning and scope are clear. First, the State seeks to question facts that have been proven by the Court and, to this end repeats arguments that it had already submitted “and ingeniously indicates an alleged undue interference by the Court in the sphere of domestic criminal justice.” Regarding the latter, the representatives indicated that, during the proceedings before the Court, the State argued the absence of evidence that could confirm the participation of State agents in the rape of the victim, and the Court expressly decided this matter in the judgment. The representatives also affirmed that the State “questions the Court’s competence to consider these facts proven” even when “it is evident […] that [the Court] attributes the conduct that violated human rights to a specific public authority, which is what enables the Court to attribute it to the State.” In this regard, if the Court “did not have the power to establish the facts of the case, including that the authors of a human rights violation belonged to a State entity, it could not perform its functions.” The representatives highlighted that, as noted in the judgment, the evidence produced during the proceedings was sufficient for the Court to find State responsibility, and that the State did not provide any evidence in the proceedings before the Court that would contradict that Mrs. Fernández Ortega was raped. 23. The representatives added that the State’s allegation that the Court had interfered in the sphere of the domestic criminal justice system should be dismissed, because “establishing how the facts occurred does not imply attributing individual criminal responsibilities.” The Court “did not make any assertions […] concerning aspects such as the guilt of certain identified individuals, the punishment to be