that not challenging the procedural actions did not affect the ability to challenge subsequent actions nor did it prevent, on the whole, the due defense regarding the fines that were imposed on the alleged victim. 121. On the other hand, the Court notes that no specific argumentation was presented to substantiate that the 15 working days to provide evidence per se constituted a disproportionate restriction of the right to defense. Thus, in the specific case, the representatives did not show how that period limited the possibility of an adequate defense, as it has been demonstrated in another case before this Court that proved that a day for counsel to review the entire case file was a violation of the right to defend the accused. 223 122. Moreover, the Court considers that the arguments of the Venezuelan domestic courts are not unreasonable for not having considered certain witnesses proposed by the alleged victim in the respective proceedings for the determination of responsibility. In any case, the Court notes that the representatives did not make a statement regarding the State's argument on the alleged testimonial evidence indicated by the defense of Mr. López Mendoza that despite the determination of dates to be put forward this evidence, were never submitted.224 Finally, the Court notes that Mr. López Mendoza had the opportunity to appeal the decision against him and that in response to the appeal for annulment filed there was a judicial assessment of the allegations of the defense in connection with the determination of the facts and the applicable law in connection with administrative offenses and fines imposed. (supra paras. 57, 63, 80, and 85). 123. For these reasons, the Court finds that there is no violation in regard to the right to defense and the right to appeal the sanctioning decision against Mr. López Mendoza, in connection with administrative proceedings that ended the determination of responsibility and in the imposition of fines. 1.2. Presumption of innocence 1.2.1. Arguments of the parties 124. The representatives stated that the presumption of innocence involves the “right to prove one’s innocence” and, nevertheless, in this case the charges against Mr. López Mendoza are based on an "objective responsibility, [...] that does not [...] require guilt or injury for its imposition, but rather requires a mere transgression of the law regarding the 223 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. V. Perú. Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 141 224 The Office of Determination of Responsibility noted that “regarding the testimonial eveidence indicated by the defense, […] it warned that in order to safeguard the constitutional right of the accused [on the 24th and 29th of September, 2004, […] the opportunity was given to receive the information that the representation of the accused sought to provide, nevertheless, at no time did the representation provide said witnesses. As a consequence, the deciding body decided that upon not having produced such testimony, there is no basis for a decision.” Deciding order of October 29, 2004, of the Office of Determination of Responsibility, supra note 85, folios 199 and 200. Similarly, upon resolving the Motion to reconsider, this criteria was reiterated upon noting that “the petitioners did not present, for review, on the dates set (24th and 29th of September 2004), the witnesses promoted by the Comptroller General, this being an obligation of the interested party, to which the deciding body, deemed in the order […] given that no testimony was rendered, there was no facts upon which to render a decision. From this, the Comptroller General—pursuant to law and in no way—violated the right to defense of the petitoners.” Resolution of March 28, 2005, of the Office of Determination of Responsibility, supra note 88, folio 278. 52